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Notes
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION TO PREVENT
CORPORATE MERGERS
By Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act' the Federal Trade Commission is empowered
to prevent ,corporations engaged in interstate commerce from acquiring the stock of
other corporations similarly engaged when such acquisition would substantially less-
en competition. The intention of the Act was first to close judge-made loopholes
in the less precisely worded Sherman Act2 which had been enervated by the "rule
of reason" and second, by the speedier administrative procedure of the Federal Trade
Commission to prevent in their incipiency practices which the earlier statute could
reach only after they had matured to the public harm. Neither purpose has been
fully attained. Though the Federal Trade Commission has acted with success in spe-
cific instances to curtail the extent of some holding companies' multi-corporate dom-
ination,3 the powers vested in the Commission have been consistently restricted in
breadth and usefulness to the letter rather than to the spirit of the Clayton Act.4
The scope of these powers has recently come up for fresh review by the Supreme
Court in Arrow-Hart and Hegeman Company v. Federal Trade Commission.5 The
Commission had filed a complaint to compel a holding company, devised to control
two important competing electrical manufacturing corporations, to divest itself of the
stock of the two original companies, an admittedly legitimate exercise of authority.
Before a decree could be issued by the Commission, the management of the holding
company manipulated the return of the stock in a manner that ensured voting
1. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §§ 12-27 (1926).
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-4 (1926).
3. Aluminum Co. of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 284 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 3d,
1922), cert. den., 261 U. S. 616 (1923); Federal Trade Commission v. Thatcher Manu-
facturing Co., 272 U. S. 554 (1926); Swift and Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 U. S.
554 (1926).
4. Cf. Western Meat Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 U. S. 554 (1926); Federal
Trade Commission v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U. S. 619 (1927); see cases cited in note 3,
supra. The same inclination to restrict the powers and jurisdiction of the Commission has
from the beginning marked the Court's decisions in cases involving prohibition of unfair
methods of competition. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920)
(restricting the jurisdiction of the Commission to precedents established under the common
law and judicial decisions); Federal Trade Commission v. Beech Nut Packing Co., 257 U.
S. 441 (1922) (reasserting that it is duty of courts rather than Commission to determine
meaning of "unfair methods of competition"); Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Pub-
lishing Co., 260 U. S. 568 (1923) (The Court may examine the whole record to determine
if there are material facts not reported by the Commission and may decide the controversy
upon them); Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463 (1923) (with
similar cases decided at same time cut heavily into substantive power of Commission to
determine unfair trade practices). The most extreme stand was in Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19 (1929) and in Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co.,
283 U. S. 643 (1931) (Public interest-a condition precedent to action by the Commission-
is a jurisdictional requirement to be determined by the courts).
5. 54 Sup. Ct. 532 (1934).
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strength to carry out a merger. The merger was effected and the Commission,
claiming it to be "a subterfuge designed in an attempt to evade the Clayton Act,"
filed a supplemental complaint to require what was now one corporation again to
become two as contemplated by the original action. Following the course laid out in
Western Meat. Company v. Federal Trade Commission6 and Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Eastman Kodak Company7 the Supreme Court held that the whole
matter was now beyond the Commission's statutory jurisdiction since the merger
was effected before the issuance of a specific restraining order.
This decision confines the jurisdiction of the Commission within boundaries even
narrower than those previously outlined by the Supreme Court. While there is no
doubt that under the Clayton Act the Commission may compel divestment of
acquisitions of a competing company's stock when such acquisitions tend substantially
to lessen interstate competition,8 the Act has been construed not to grant power to
compel the sale back of a competing corporation's assets which were purchased before
the Commission took any action, even though the purchase was negotiated by means
of illegal stock ownership.9 The Commission can, however, by an order requiring
return of stock to persons not under the influence of the acquiring corporation pre-
clude use of securities illegally obtained to secure control of competitors' property
which has not actually been purchased prior to issuance of the decree.' 0 The opin-
ion in the instant case enunciates the rule that the Commission cannot prevent the
manipulation of wrongfully acquired stock to bring about a merger even where juris-
diction is taken prior to purchase of the competing company's property if the con-
trolling group against whom the complaint was issued divests itself of the stock
before the Commission can issue a decree; jurisdiction is lost, since the merger is not
of itself illegal. But as Mr. Justice Stone points out in his dissent, the stock unlaw-
fully acquired by the holding company in the present case was not released until the
merger of the two operating companies was assured. The Commission might well
retain jurisdiction for this purpose of dissolving a combination which could have
been prevented had a decree been obtained more promptly. The Commission may
now find that in the future hurried and perforce ill-considered action will be essential
to preserve its powers. 1 And further, although the Commission may in its decree
6. 272 U. S. 554 (1926). The court here said that where a corporation has unlawfully
acquired all the stock of a competitor but not its plant or other property the order prop-
erly directs it to divest itself of its stock in such wise as will restore competition and not
leave the corporation in control of the competitors as would happen if it first used the
stock to secure such control and then divested by dissolving the other corporation. But
where a corporation unlawfully buys its competitor's property before the Commission
takes action, the Commission is not empowered by the statute to order the corporation to
divest itself of the property; the remedy, if an unlawful status has resulted, is in the courts.
7. 274 U. S. 619 (1927). After quoting the Western Meat Case the Court continues:
"So here the Commission has no authority to require that the company divest itself of
the ownership of the laboratories which it had acquired prior to any action by the Com-
mission. If the ownership or maintenance of these laboratories has produced any unlawful
status, the remedy must be administered by the courts in appropriate proceedings therein
instituted."
8. Federal Trade Commission v. Thatcher Manufacturing Co., 272 U. S. 554 (1926);
Swift and Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 U. S. 554 (1926).
9. Western Meat Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 U. S. 554 (1926).
10. Ibid.
11. See McFAR.ANm, JuoicA CONTROL or THE FEDnAn TRAD CoZrnssioN (1933).
Commenting on the earlier cases tending in the same direction it is said, at page 68:
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make specific provision for the disposition of the illegally acquired stock,' 2 the
instant decision indicates that if the decree fails expressly to prohibit all the possible
evasions by which corporate union might be achieved the controlling interests may
still be able to escape from the jurisdictional enclosure by evasive action.
It may be true that the Commission's jurisdiction even circumscribed by the
holding of this case is generally sufficient for the enforcement of the Clayton Act.
Mergers, especially of large corporations, are usually wrought through the medium
of complex holding company schemes, since it is extremely difficult even for power-
ful groups to find the requisite capital for outright purchase of working stock-control.
A group holding in the beginning a small percentage of the voting power can obtain
the two-thirds vote generally required by law to effectuate a merger only by years'
accumulation of effort, by unusual prestige, or-the more certain method-by careful
construction of corporate pyramids. 1- The Commission, if it acts with celerity, can
prevent would-be offenders from obtaining by manipulation of stock-control the
power to merge. Mergers accomplished either by the real consent of independent
stockholders or by the simple purchase of physical assets, obviously of more excep-
tional occurrence, remain beyond the reach of the Federal Trade Commission because
not contrary to the Clayton Act. If offensive to public policy in result they may be
prosecuted by the Department of Justice under the Sherman Act.14 But to refer
back, as the Court does here, to the provision of the latter statute as the only pos-
sible remedy against a combination built through stock acquisitions expressly pro-
hibited by Section 7 of the Clayton Act, is either to follow too narrowly the trend
of precedent, or to express indirectly a fundamental antagonism to a clear legislative
policy.
VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL SALES LICENSE TAX
THE tremendous increase in recent years of both wholesale and retail distribution by
truck, made possible by modem facilities for rapid and inexpensive highway trans-
portation, has. proved a serious threat to the small merchandiser in suburban com-
munities. An effective method of meeting this competition from the large city con-
cer, affording to the smaller town at the same time a not unwelcome means of
securing additional revenue without increased burden on residents, has been found
in municipal license taxes on selling, soliciting orders for, or delivering goods within
the city limits.1 But many of these ordinances have failed to survive the test of
"These decisions establish a race for priority-the Commission must discover impending
business mergers and take action before there is an acquisition of the assets of competitors.
Although the first comment by the Commission is non-committal, in later years these de-
cisions are referred to as 'practically nullifying' the statute."
12. Western Meat Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 U. S. 554 (1926).
13. For statistics on mergers effected between 1922 and 1929, see BERLE AND MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) appendix.
14. The possibility of this remedy has been urged by the court not only in the present
case but also in the two preceding cases dealing with a similar problem. Cf. Western
Meat Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 U. S. 554 (1926); Federal Trade Commission
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U. S. 619 (1927). But see Aluminum Co. of America v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 284 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922), cert. den. 261 U. S. 616 (1923).
Mr. justice Brandeis has very fully met this argument in his dissent to the Western Meat
case.
1. French, Municipal Tariffs under the Guise of Occupation Taxes (1933) 18 IowA
L. REv. 342.
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litigation, being declared invalid if their effect is to erect a tariff barrier for the
benefit of the local tradesmen or to discriminate against out-of-town merchants as
such.2 The fate of the usual provision exempting those whose principal place of
business is within the local subdivision has depended upon whether it operates as an
arbitrary classification based on residence3 or makes a reasonable distinction between
two essentially different methods of doing business. 4
The Supreme Court of Florida, however, introduced novel doctrine into the field
by holding invalid an ordinance of the City of Cocoa which subjected non-residents
making sales or deliveries within the city limits to the same license tax as local
dealers. In the original opinion the measure was declared void on the absurd
ground that a clause exempting interstate commerce from its provisions rendered it
discriminatory against merchants within the state. 6  On rehearing this reasoning
was repudiated, and it was said that the fatal defect of the ordinance was that it was
extraterritorial in its operation and that a municipality can no more impose a burden
on interurban commerce than can a state on interstate commerce.
The defect of extraterritoriality is the defect of inherent lack of jurisdiction.
7
Although the legislature is competent to extend the police power of a city beyond
its territorial limits,8 it may be conceded that the taxing power cannot be thus
2. In two interesting cases in California the ordinances were attacked on the ground
that they discriminated in favor of non-residents who used another method of delivery.
This contention was upheld in Town of St. Helena v. Butterworth, 198 Cal. 230, 244 Pac.
357 (1926); but overruled in E. A. Hoffman Candy Co., Inc. v. City of Newport Beach,
120 Cal. App. 525, 8 P. (2d) 235 (1932).
3. Chalker v. Birmingham & Northwestern Ry. Co., 249 U. S. 522 (1919); Campbell
Baking Co. v. City of Harrisonville, 19 F. (2d) 159 (W. D. Mo. 1927); Ward Baking
Co. v. City of Fernandina, 29 F. (2d) 789 (S. D. Fla. 1928); Campbell Baking Co. v. City
of Maryville, 31 F. (2d) 466 (W. D. Mo. 1929); In re Robinson, 68 Cal. App. 744, 230
Pac. 175 (1924); American Bakeries Co. v. City of Griffin, 174 Ga. 115, 162 S. E. 513
(1932); In re Irish, 122 Kan. 33, 250 Pac. 1056 (1926); Hair v. City of Humbolt, 133
Kan. 67, 299 Pac. 268 (1931); Nafziger Baking Co. v. City of Salisbury, 329 Mo. 1014, 48
S. W. (2d) 563 (1932); P. F. Petersen Baking Co. v. City of Fremont, 119 Neb. 212, 228
N. W. 256 (1929) (itinerant vendors), noted in (1930) 9 NIM. L. BULL. 204; Grantham v.
City of Chickasha, 156 Okla. 56, 9 P. (2d) 747 (1932) semble.
4. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304 (1914); Campbell Baking Co.
v. City of Harrisonville, 50 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Mathison, Sheriff, v. Brister,
166 Miss. 67, 145 So. 358 (1933); People ex rel. Ellis v. Cowdrick, 150 Misc. Rep. 285,
268 N. Y. Supp. 825 (Co. Ct. 1934); Croswell & Co., Inc. v. Town of Bishopville, 172
S. C. 26, 172 S. E. 698 (1934); Richmond Linen Supply Co. v. City of Lynchburg, 160
Va. 644, 169 S. E. 554 (1933).
5. Duffin v. Tucker, Chief of Police, 153 So. 298 (1934).
6. See Powell, Supreme Court Condonations and Condemnations of Discriminatory State
Taxation, 1922-1925 (1926) 12 VA. L. Rrv. 441, 546, at 449; Raley & Brothers v. Richard-
son, 264 U. S. 157 (1924); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 499
(1887); Standard Oil Co. v. City of Selma, 2f6 Ala. 108, 112 So. 532 (1927); Brownback
v. Burgess, etc. of Borough of North Wales, 194 Pa. 609, 45 AUt. 660 (1900); State v.
Pioneer Oil & Refining Co., 292 S. W. 869 (Tex. Com. of App. 1927); City of San
Antonio v. Teague, 54 S. W. (2d) 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
7. Poweli, Contemporary Commerce Clause Controversies over State Taxation (1928)
76 U. or P. L. R-v. 773, 958, at 775.
8. Chicago Packing & Provision Co. v. City of Chicago, 88 Ill. 221 (1878); 3 McQumrixn,
MUNICIPAL COPORArIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 952; Anderson, The Extraterritorial Powers of
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enlarged. 9 An occupational tax, to be valid, must be levied only on those doing
business within the area over which the taxing power extends. One engaged in inter-
state or interurban commerce, however, is doing business within the state or city1
The Supreme Court of the United States has specifically recognized that the vice of
taxing interstate commerce is not the vice of taxing what is beyond the jurisdic-
tion;11 the immunity arises from a restriction on the power, not from the lack of
it. The ordinances under consideration, then, do not fall within the prohibition against
extraterritorial taxation.
Constitutional theory moreover does not compel an exemption of interurban com-
merce analogous to that accorded interstate commerce, for the relation of the city
to the state is not identical with that of the state to the United States. The latter
involves two sovereigns, the powers of one of which are restricted by, and those of
the other derived from, the Constitution. The reason for the state's disability to
tax interstate commerce is that such a tax would conflict with the paramount implied
will of Congress that that commerce should not be burdened.' 2 The municipality,
on the other hand, acts as the instrumentality of the state, exercising only such
power as has been delegated to it. If the legislature has authorized the tax, no
question of conflict with the state's supremacy can arise.13 Thus, objections like
those sustained by the Florida court have not been frequently considered in the
cases involving these taxes; but when urged they have been definitely rejected.
14
Cities (1926) 10 Mum. L. Rxv. 475, 564, at 572 et seq., reprinted in (1927) 61 Am. L.
REv. 641, at 680 et seq.
9. Wells v. City of Weston, 22 Mo. 384 (1856); Robinson v. City of Norfolk, 108 Va.
14, 60 S. E. 762 (1908); 3 McQuzim, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 1095. But cf. Lang-
home and Scott v. Robinson, 20 Gratt. 661 (Va. 1871). See also Anderson, supra note 8,
at 565 et seq., 61 Am. L. Rav. at 671 et seq.
10. Edgil v. City of Carbon Hill, 214 Ala. 532, 108 So. 355 (1926) ; California Fireproof
Storage Co. v. City of Santa Monica, 206 Cal. 714, 275 Pac. 948 (1929); Young & Jones v
Town of Campbellsville, 199 Ky. 284, 250 S. W. 979 (1923); W. T. Sistrunk & Co. v.
City of Paris, 205 Ky. 835, 266 S. W. 656 (1924); Croswell & Co. v. Town of Bishopville,
supra note 4; Isaacs, An Anwjysis of Doing Business (1925) 25 COL. L. REy. 1018, at 1021
et seq.
11. International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 105 (1910).
12. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, supra note 6. This follows the prin-
ciples laid down in the leading cases of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 319
(U. S. 1851), and Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875). A necessary logical
result would seem to be that by expressing its will so to do Congress might validate state
taxes on interstate commerce. It can thus make state prohibitions on interstate commerce
operative. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311 (1917).
And the case holding that it can permit levies on federal instrumentalities is based on
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, an interstate commerce case. Van Allen v. The Assessors,
3 Wall. 573, 585 (U. S. 1865). If Congress can thus allow the states to tax interstate com-
merce, a fortiori the state can authorize municipal taxes on interurban commerce, since
there is no constitutional restriction in the way nor would the vexing problem of delega-
tion of power arise.
13. Two of the judges in the instant case wrote specially concurring opinions to the
effect that the City of Cocoa had not been authorized to levy such a tax. But if they
were correct, that defect has been remedied by Fla. Sp. Laws 1933, c. 16365, which val-
idates all past taxes and gives enlarged power to the city.
14. City of Sedalia v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 66 F. (2d) 757 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933);
City of Sacramento v. The California Stage Co., 12 Cal. 134 (1859); City of Topeka v.
And it is implicit in the opinions upholding or avoiding similar ordinances on other
grounds that these contentions are without merit. In view of the uncertainty of the
rules regarding state taxation of interstate commerce and the opprobrium that has
been cast upon them,'5 the unwisdom of extending them to a new field is evident.
Perhaps this unique legal theory found favor with the court because it felt that
the small town was attempting to extort tribute from the neighboring city. Of
course, a great number of even relatively small exactions from an extensive business
would prove burdensome.' 0 But preventing discrimination based on situs would
seem to afford sufficient protection, since it would be to the interests of the resident
merchants to keep the levies at a minimum. The obvious impolicy of compelling
a discrimination against local business,' 7 the financial distress of municipalities
throughout the country,' 8 and the general dictate of fairness that one should con-
tribute to that which supports him ought in combination to outweigh any contention
for a total immunity based on a fear of prohibitive taxes which are already amply
guarded against. The test of discrimination seems fair, and the reported cases indi-
cate no difficulty in determining the facts in each instance.19 Since the ordinance
of the City of Cocoa provided for equality, the decision of the court seems as erro-
neous as the reasoning upon which it is grounded.
PUBLIC CONTROL OF THE SELECTION OF GRAND JURORS
SINCE an early date the grand jury has been the only official body endowed with
general powers of investigation and accusation.' Authorities agree that it performs
an independent and necessary function of government; 2 and despite recent attacks
on its efficiency, it is clear that society is at least partially dependent on its
existence for the prosecution of crime in those states where it is the only body
Jones, 74 Kans. 164, 86 Pac. 162 (1906); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. City of Fre-
mont, 39 Neb. 692, 58 N. W. 415 (1894).
15. See series of articles by Powell: Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by
the Taxing Powers of the States (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 321, 572, 721, 932; (1919) 32
id. 234, 374, 634, 902; Contemporary Commerce Clause Controversies over State Taxation
(1928) 76 U. or P. L. RPv. 773, 958; State Production Taxes and The Commerce Clause
(1923) 12 CAL. L. REv. 17; State Income Taxes and the Commerce Clause (1922) 31 YALE
L. J. 799; see also Note (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1096; (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 337.
16. It was pointed out in Dugan Brothers, Inc. v. Zorn, Mayor, 145 Misc. Rep. 611, 261
N. Y. Supp. 592 (Sup. Ct. 1932), that if license fees equal to that in question were imposed
upon plaintiff by every municipality in which it was then making deliveries the annual
exaction from its business would accumulate to at least $38,000.
17. The same criticism holds here as is applicable to the interstate commerce cases.
See note 15, supra.
18. See Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 924.
19. See cases cited in notes 2, 3, 4, and 10, supra.
1. People v. Graydon, 333 Ill. 429, 164 N. E. 832 (1928); People v. Sheridan, 349
fll. 202, 181 N. E. 617 (1932); Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 AtI. 45 (1933). For
a general discussion of the powers of the grand jury see THovxsozr AND MEnmiAm, A
TREATISE o THE ORGANIZATION, CUSTODY AND CONDUCT 014 JURIS (1882) §§ 604-618;
Dession and Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries (1932) 41 YALE L. J.
687.
2. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273 (1919).
But see it re National Window Glass Works, 287 Fed. 219, 225 (N. D. Ohio 1922).
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with the power of indictment.3 That the citizen should have some control over its
selection and function in order that its choice be made free from corruption
seems axiomatic under a theory of government which receives its final sanction
from the people. Especially today, when public positions, including the grand
jury, have suffered the taint of fraud, it would seem that social policy requires
judicial assistance in eliminating the usurpation of office, and the improper selection
of grand juries, by the means the public has always used to test the authority
of its formal representatives, namely, the writ of quo warranto or its modem
equivalent under the codes.4 But in a recent decision, apparently the first of its
kind, the court denied the application of a citizen to inquire into the right of
a grand jury, alleged to have been fraudulently chosen, to hold office; it was
held that a grand juror is not an officer, since his office lacks the element of
duration and tenure, and therefore may not be subjected to quo warranto
proceedings. 5
The legalistic argument on which the decision is based is unsupported either bv
precedent or by the general theory of public office. Courts and commentators
assert that the essence of public office is the exercise of some part of the sovereign
power of the state; when one performs a function prescribed by law he is con-
sidered a public officer.6 True, some courts have mentioned the idea of duration
and tenure as one of the criteria by which to determine whether an office is
public; 7 but no court has held it a necessary condition.8  Duration moreover, has
3. See Dession and Cohen, supra note 1, at 687, et seq.
4. Hinckley v. Breen, 55 Conn. 119, 9 At. 31 (1887); Commonwealth ex rel. Davis
v. Blume, 307 Pa. 406, 161 Atl. 551 (1932); see Greene v. Knox, 175 N. Y. 432, 438,
67 N. E. 910, 912 (1903); Cella v. Davidson, 304 Pa. 389, 394, 156 Atl. 99, 100 (1932).
e Mtcnr, A TREATISE ON T- LAW oF PUBLIC OmcEs AND OFTcERS (1890) §§ 476-490.
Although the codes abolished the common law writs, the remedies still remain. Osgood v.
Jones, 60 N. H. 543 (1881); Commonwealth ex rel. Davis v. Blume, supra. The statutes
in the individual states provide who may bring the action. See Newman v. Frizzell,
238 U. S. 537, 543, 544 (1915).
5. The previous grand jury had begun an investigation of the courts, and the new
grand jury had as its foreman a relative of one who was being indicted. The selection
procedure was allegedly highly irregular, and the foreman further technically ineligible,
because he had recently served. McDuffie v. Perkerson, 173 S. E. 151 (Ga. 1933).
Quo warranto cannot be brought against an employee as distinguished from a public
officer. Attorney General v. Drohan, 169 Mass. 534, 48 N. E. 279 (1897); People ex rel.
Throop v. Langdon, 40 Mich. 673 (1879); State v. Jennings, 57 Ohio St. 415, 49 N. E.
404 (1898). By deciding that a grand juror was not a public officer, it necessarily
followed that the remedy sought was improper. Mxcrmi, op. cit. supra note 4, § 479;
HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES (1896) § 625.
6. See Bradford v. Justices of Inferior Court, 33 Ga. 332, 336 (1862); Attorney
General v. Tillinghast, 203 Mass. 539, 543, 89 N. E. 1058, 1060 (1909); People ex rel.
Throop v. Langdon, supra note 5; State ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins, 79 Mont. 506, 509, 510,
257 Pac. 411, 413 (1927) and cases cited therein. MEcHEm, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1
et seq.
7. Courts generally quote from the decision in United States v. Hartwell (73 U. S.
385 (1867)] to this effect. In that case, a clerk in the assistant-treasurer's office, appointed
by the treasurer, was held a public officer.
8. See State v. Quinn, 35 N. M. 62, 65, 290 Pac. 786, 787 (1930); State v. Stanley,
66 N. C. 59, 63, 64 (1872); MEcHEr, op. cit. supra note 4, § 8; THnoop, A TREATIsn
ON THE LAW RELATING TO PUBLIC OMrCERS (1892) § 8; Note (1928) 53 A. L. R. 595, 606.
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always referred to the office itself and not to its incumbency; this criterion, assuming
its necessity, does not preclude the designation of the grand jury as a public
office.0 However, a definition of public office in the abstract seems futile and
meaningless; an office may be public for the purpose of protecting its holder from
civil liability, and not public for preventing him from occupying another position
of public trust.' 0 The distinction between public office and employment is only
to be drawn when considering a definite objective. In the principal case, the court
apparently did not examine the functional nature of the grand jury in relation
to the writ of quo warranto, and failed adequately to appreciate the urgent social
problem behind the request for such a discretionary remedy. Hence it failed
to recognize the importance of the grand jury in the social order as the sole
criterion for determining whether it was a public office, and arrived at a mani-
festly unfortunate result.11
If it is assumed, however, that a grand juror is not to be defined as a "public
officer" against whom quo warranto may be brought, mandamus would be the only
remedy available to test his authority.12 The selection of the grand jury is one
of the ministerial duties of the court.' 3 Since mandamus is the formal method
by which a citizen or the attorney general may request the superior court to
force one who has assumed a governmental duty, to perform the requirements
of his office, that device might be used to question the regularity of the lower
court's action in the instant case.14 Because of the improper selection of the
existing grand jury, the court might be ordered to discharge it, and select another
in accord with the procedure prescribed by law. In view of the fact that no
extraordinary writ other than quo warranto will lie when title to the public office
is involved, 15 mandamus may be used only when it is certain the court will refuse
to consider the grand jury a public office.' 6 Although this writ is said to be
discretionary, in the absence of quo warranto, the court would feel impelled to
9. The distinction was made by Chief Justice Marshall. United States v. Maurice,
Fed. Cas. No. 15747 at 1211, 1214, 2 Brock. 96, 103 (C. C. D. Va. 1823); MECHEM, op. cit.
supra note 4, § 8.
10. Cf. Shaw v. United States, 180 Fed. 348 (C. C. A. 6th, 1910); Turpen v. Booth,
56 Cal. 65 (1880); State v. Bradley, 48 Conn. 535 (1881).
11. The court in the instant case quotes from Mechem for the purpose of classifying
grand jurors as quasi-judicial officers. But see cases cited supra note 1; MECHEM, op.
cit. supra note 4, § 480 (quasi-judicial officers may be challenged by quo warranto pro-
ceedings.)
12. Johnson v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 178, 283 Pac. 331 (1929); Citizen's
Bank v. Cherokee, Tp., 25 Pac. (2d) 1019 (Kan. 1933); Wilkinson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 199 N. C. 669, 155 S. E. 562 (1930); Fmms, THE LAW oF ExMAoNonAvRY LEGAL
REarans (1926) §§ 187-191.
13. See State v. Stanley, supra note 8, at 68.
14. The parties who may sue vary with different statutes. See Matter of McCabe v.
Voorhis, 243 N. Y. 401, 411, 153 N. E. 849, 851 (1926); cf. Levitt v. Attorney General,
111 Conn. 634, 644, 151 AtI. 171, 175, 176 (1930); F ais, op. cit. supra note 12, at
§ 194.
15. Injunction will not He. Greene v. Knox, supra note 4; Brower v. Kantner, 190
Pa. 182, 43 Atl. 7 (1899). Nor will certiorari lie. State ex rel. Crow v. Harrison, 141 Mo.
12, 41 S. W. 971 (1897); Randolph v. City of Rahway, 106 N. J. Law 296, 148 Atl. 793
(1930).
16. Miner v. Beurmann. 165 Mich. 672, 131 N. W. 388 (1911); Clarken v. Blomstrom,
26 Pac. (2d) 87 (Wash. 1933).
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grant it, because it is then the only method by which society can control an
important public function.17
VALUATION Or LIFE TENANT'S INTEREST UNDER NEw YORK STATUTE LIMITING
BEQUESTS TO CHARITY
A TESTATOR died in 1928, survived by a daughter, sister, niece, and a nephew. His
will provided for certain small legacies and left the residuary estate to a trust com-
pany, directing payment of the income to the daughter until she reached the age
of thirty-five years, at which time she was to receive the principal. In the event
of her death before thirty-five, the principal was to go to her issue, and in default
of issue the entire residue was left to a hospital. The sixth paragraph of the will
provided that, "in the event that any of the contingencies shall occur upon the hap-
pening of which . .. a gift to St. Mark's Hospital shall take effect and if, notwith-
standing the happening of such contingency, such gift to St. Mark's Hospital ...
for any reason shall not in whole or in part be effectual, then in so far as such
gift shall not extend or be effectual, I give, devise, and bequeath the said rest,
residue and remainder of the property and estate . . . to such person or persons
as would be entitled to the same ... if the same were personal property and I
had died at the time of the happening of such contingency possessed thereof
intestate without leaving a wife me surviving."' The daughter died in 1932 without
issue, before attaining the age of thirty-five, having received during her lifetime
slightly over $3,000 from her father's estate, which, at his death, amounted to approxi-
mately $38,000 less some insignificant debts. Her husband, sole beneficiary under
her will, contested the validity of his father-in-law's testamentary gift to the hospi-
tal as in violation of Section 17 of the New York Decedent Estate Law,2 providing
that no person having a husband, wife, child, or descendant or parent, may devise or
bequeath to charity more than one-half of his estate, after payment of debts, and
that such devise or bequest is valid only to that extent. The court held that there
was a violation in this case, because the sums actually received by the daughter and
the other individual beneficiaries were considerably less than the remainder which
was to go to the hospital, and that the gift of the residue to it, subject to the daugh-
ter's life estate, could be upheld only as to one-half of the total value of the estate
as of the testator's death. The excess was held to have passed to the daughter by
intestacy, and consequently, through her, to her husband. Since the hospital had
been adjudicated a bankrupt in 1931 and ceased to function, it could not take testa-
mentary gifts.3 Therefore, the one-half share permitted by Section 17 to be be-
17. Cf. Kelley v. Kingsbury, 210 Cal. 37; 290 Pac. 885 (1930); State ex rel. Coen v.
Industrial Commission of Ohio, 126 Ohio St. 550, 554, 186 N. E. 398, 399 (1933);
Ferris, op. cit. supra note 12, § 192.
1. Statement of the wording has been taken from a copy of the will. The "contin-
gency," at the happening of which the intestate successors were to be determined, clearly
was the death of the daughter under thirty-five without leaving issue, rather than the
failure of the gift to the hospital.
2. N. Y. Laws 1909, c. 18, § 17, reenacting N. Y. Laws 1860, c. 360, § 1.
3. See In re Walter's Estate, 150 Misc. 512, 513, 269 N. Y. Supp. 400, 402 (Surr. Ct.
1933), where a testamentary gift to the same hospital was held to pass cy pres to the
other charitable legatees mentioned in the will. In the instant case such a disposition
would not further the intent of the testator, as he provided specifically for distribution in
case the named hospital did not take the legacy.
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queathed to it was ordered distributed to the surviving sister, niece, and nephew
of the testator.
4
Although the court did not discuss the issue, consideration of the husband's power
to contest the gift to charity seems relevant. No suit to question the validity of
the will under Section 17 was brought by the daughter during her lifetime, despite
the fact that anyone who would derive benefit from a successful contest, as she
would have done, might have done so under the form of the statute at the time of
the testator's death.5 Since the testator had died prior to the adoption of the 1929
amendment, the present provision expressly limiting the power to contest to the
persons specifically named in the statute has no application. 6 In view of the fact
that the statute is aimed at preventing a private wrong to certain members of one's
family, and is not an expression of public p9licy against gifts to charity,7 it would
seem more logical if the right to contest, even under the old form of Section 17,
were limited to those who, by virtue of being intestate successors, would derive added
benefit if the gift were partially invalidated as of the time of the testator's death.8
4. In re Ruttenau's Estate, 149 Misc. 626, 269 N. Y. Supp. 225 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
5. It has frequently been held in New York that anyone deriving benefit might contest
as long as the testator was survived by a husband, wife, child, parent, or descendant. Robb
v. Washington and Jefferson College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359 ('1906); Decker v.
Vreeland, 220 N. Y. 326, 115 N. E. 989 (1917); Fisher v. Lister, 130 Misc. 1, 223 N. Y.
Supp. 321 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Wo'Erx, AmmcAN LAW OF ADnAnNsTRAnoN (3d ed. 1923)
724; cf. In re Smallman's Estate, 141 Misc. 796, 253 N. Y. Supp. 628 (Surr. Ct. 1931)
(a general legatee whose abated legacy would be increased if part of the charitable gift
should be invalidated was permitted to contest), noted in (1932) 41 YAlE L. J. 771; In re
Howell's Estate, 146 Misc. 169, 261 N. Y. Supp. 859 (Surr. Ct. 1933) (identity of con-
testant considered immaterial and excessive legacy treated as void). Contra: Monahan v.
O'Byrne, 147 Ga. 633, 95 S. E. 210 (1917) (grandniece not permitted to contest after
death of testator's surviving children); see Trustees of Amherst College v. Ritch, 91 Hun
509, 532, 36 N. Y. Supp. 576, 588 (Sup. Ct. 1895) (the widow, sole intestate successor at
death of testator, waived contest, and other relatives held not permitted to contest after
her death); In re Beers' Estate, 85 App. Div. 132, 137, 83 N. Y. Supp. 67, 70 .(3d Dep't
1903) (waiver by husband excludes contest by other relatives).
6. N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, § 3. The final sentence of the amendment, providing that
no allowance shall be made in case of a postponement of a gift to a charity, is aimed at
preventing the payment of interest during the period of postponement, which was allowed
in In re Seymour's Estate, 122 Misc. 343, 203 N. Y. Supp. 914 (Surr. Ct. 1924) aff'd, 209
App. Div. 655, 205 N. Y. Supp. 327 (2nd Dep't 1924), aff'd, 239 N. Y. 259, 146 N. E.
372 (1925); see Matter of Apple, 141 Misc. 380, 384, 252 N. Y. Supp. 580, 583 (Surr. Ct.
1931). The amendment affects only wills of persons dying after Aug. 31, 1930. N. Y.
Laws 1929, c. 229, § 21.
7. See Monahan v. O'Byrne, supra note 5, at 634, 95 S. E. at 210; Hollis v. Drew
Theological Seminary, 95 N. Y. 166, 174 (1884); St. John v. Andrews Institute, 191 N. Y.
254, 272, 83 N. E. 981, 985 (1908); Matter of Brooklyn Trust Co., 179 App. Div. 262,
265, 166 N. Y. Supp. 513, 516 (2nd Dep't 1917); Matter of Apple, s1pra note 6, at 383, 252
N. Y. Supp. at 583.
S. The following cases have held to this effect: White v. Howard, 38 Conn. 342,358 (1871)
(based on the New York statute); Storrs v. St. Luke's Hospital, 180 Ill. 368, 54 N. E.
185 (1899) ; Karolusson v. Paonessa, 207 Iowa 127, 222 N. W. 431 (1928) ; In re Thompson's
Estate, 126 Misc. 99, 213 N. Y. Supp. 422 (Surr. Ct. 1925); Ligon v. Hawkes, 110 Tenn.
514, 75 S. W. 1072 (1903). Contra: Robb v. Washington and Jefferson College, supra note 5;
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Indeed, charitable bequests are encouraged as long as they do not deprive those
named in the statute of sufficient support from the testator's estate.9 If, however,
the surviving spouse, parent, or descendant should die without contesting the legacy
to charity, or if the contest should be started but not completed when such survivor
died, then the reason for the statutory limitation ceases to exist. The right to contest
a will seems to be a personal right which should die with the contestant rather than
a property right which passes to the next of kin or personal representatives.' 0 It is
analogous to the spouse's right to elect a statutory share under Section 18 of the
Decedent Estate Law, which has been held not to pass to representatives." There-
fore, since the daughter chose not to contest the validity of the remainder to charity,
it would seem to be more in accord with the legislative policy not to permit her
husband or other, more distant, relatives to do so. This conclusion seems substan-
tiated by the provisions of the 1929 amendment to Section 17.
It is fundamental that the value of an estate and of legacies is to be fixed as of
the testator's death.12 In order to determine whether in the present case more was
left to the hospital than to individuals, it was necessary to ascertain the value of
the daughter's life estate. At the time the will was offered for probate, it was
impossible to know whether or not the charity would receive anything at all under
the will; for, if the daughter lived to be thirty-five, or left issue surviving, the hos-
pital would receive nothing. When there is a contingent gift of this nature, there
is authority for holding that the determination of the value should be postponed
until the termination of the life estate.'5 Where the life tenant has died at the time
the question is raised, many cases have held that the actual duration of the tenancy
should be the gauge by which the value is to be determined, on the ground that the
best evidence available should be utilized in order to obtain accuracy.14 However,
Fisher v. Lister, supra note 5; In re Sloat's Will, 141 Misc. 710, 253 N. Y. Supp. 215
(Surr. Ct. 1931); see Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 771.
9. See St. John v. Andrews Institute, supra note 7, at 273, 83 N. E. at 986.
10. Cain v. Burger, 219 Ala. 10, 121 So. 17 (1929); Storrs v. St. Luke's Hospital, supra
note 8; Selden v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 239 Ill. 67, 87 N. E. 860 (1909);
Diffenderfer and Hungerford v. Griffith and Griffith, 57 Md. 81 (1881); Braeuel v. Reuther,
270 Mo. 603, 193 S. W. 283 (1917); Ligon v. Hawkes, supra note 8. Contra: Estate of
Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 150 Pac. 989 (1915); Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey, 178 Ind.
258, 98 N. E. 177 (1912) ; cf. Carolan v. O'Donnell, 141 App. Div. 463, 126 N. Y. Supp. 551
1st Dep't 1910); see PACE, WILLs (2d ed. 1926) § 549.
11. In re Mihlman's Will, 140 Misc. 535, 251 N. Y. Supp. 147 (Surr. Ct. 1931). But
see Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey, supra note 10.
12. Hollis v. Drew Theological Seminary, supra note 7, at 177; Matter of Durand,
194 N. Y. 477, 488, 87 N. E. 677, 680 (1909); Frost v. Emanuel, 152 App. Div. 687, 689,
137 N. Y. Supp. 559, 560 (2d Dep't 1912); In re Opdyke's Will, 255 N. Y. 255, 259, 174
N. E. 646, 647 (1931), noted in (1931) 44 HAgv. L. Rzv. 660.
13. Rich v. Tiffany, 2 App. Div. 25, 37 N. Y. Supp. 330 (4th Dep't 1896); In re Allen's
Will, 111 Misc. 93, 181 N. Y. Supp. 398 (Surr. Ct. 1920); In re Waddell's Estate, 129
Misc. 495, 222 N. Y. Supp. 591 (Surr. Ct. 1927); Fisher v. Lister, supra note 5 (all holding
that the valuation of the life estate must be postponed until the death of the life tenant
because he had the privilege of using part of the principal) ; Matter of Franklin Trust Co.,
190 App. Div. 575, 180 N. Y. Supp. 293 (2d Dep't 1920) (evaluation postponed because
the life estate was to last during period of the tenant's widowhood); Matter of Suydam,
138 Misc. 873, 248 N. Y. Supp. 176 (Surr. Ct. 1931) (contingent remainders).
14. Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Heiner, 19 F. (2d) 362 (W. D. Pa. 1927);
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to use life-expectancy tables in evaluating a life estate, as must be done if the ques-
tion arises during the life of the life tenant, even if the remainder is contingent 15
is more in accord with the oft expressed desire to fix the value as of the date of the
testator's death. Their use in all cases would eliminate the uncertainty of two alterna-
tive methods of valuing the life estate, the choice depending upon the accidental factor
of the time at which the issue arises. Possible contestants would no longer await
hopefully an early death of the life tenant. Another advantage in their use would be
found in the fact that testators would be enabled to estimate roughly the sums that
could be left to charity without the possibility of having their wishes frustrated by
the unexpectedly early demise of the life beneficiary and by a subsequent contest.
The inaccuracies always connected with expectancy tables would result in no more
hardships in these cases than in other matters in which they are used. It seems
more desirable to use them in all situations.' 6
Under this method, if the life tenant's expectancy is equal to or greater than the
period of time necessary for a fund to double at the allowable interest rate, then the
charitable remainderman can not be said to have been left more than the life tenant.
17
In the instant case, the testator's daughter was under twenty-five when the testator
Matter of Teed, 59 Hun 63 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Matter of Runk, 55 Misc. 478, 106 N. Y.
Supp. 851 (Surr. Ct. 1907); Frost v. Emanuel, supra note 12; In re Suydam's Estate, 122
Misc. 340, 203 N. Y. Supp. 911 (Surr. Ct. 1924); In re Blumenthal's Estate, 124 Misc. 850,
208 N. Y. Supp. 682 (Surr. Ct. 1925), aff'd, 214 App. Div. 784, 210 N. Y. Supp. 828 (1st
Dep't 1925); Fisher v. Lister, supra note 5, rev'd on this point, 222 App. Div. 841, 226
N. Y. Supp. 484 (3d Dep't 1928); see In re Arnolt's Estate, 127 Misc. 579, 584, 217 N. Y.
Supp. 323, 328 (Surr. Ct. 1926).
15. If the remainder is contingent, there seems to be no reason why the value of the
life estate should not be determined as the least amount the life tenant may expect to
receive according to mortality tables. Some times he is privileged to use part of the
principal if he finds it necessary; surely then he is receiving at least as much as if he had
a mere interest in the income, and if the latter be greater than one-half the estate there is
no violation of the statute. Even when the termination of the life estate depends upon
either the remarriage or death of the life tenant, the expectancy tables could be used, as
it is possible to determine what he may expect to receive, and, unless by his own act he
defeats that result, the expectation is the value of his interest. See Fisher v. Lister, supra
note 14; cf. In re Shiman's Estate, 130 Misc. 716, 224 N. Y. Supp. 363 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
16. Life expectancy tables were used in the following cases in which the life tenant
was living when the question arose: Jasme v. Mercer, 176 Ga. 256, 168 S. E. 16 (1932);
Hollis v. Drew Theological Seminary, supra note 7; In re Arnolt's Estate, supra note 14;
In re Shiman's Estate, supra note 15; In re Slattery's Estate, 132 Misc. 319, 230 N. Y.
Supp. 267 (Surr. Ct. 1928); Matter of Loewenthal, 138 Misc. 871, 247 N. Y. Supp. 629
(Surr. Ct. 1931); Matter of Apple, supra note 6; In re Sloat's Will, supra note 8; In re
Smalman's Estate, supra note 5; In re McArdle's Will, 147 Misc. 876, 264 N. Y. Supp. 764
(Surr. Ct. 1933). They were used in the following cases even where the actual duration
of the tenant's life was known: Matter of Durand, supra note 12; In re Strang, 121 App.
Div. 112, 105 N. Y. Supp. 566 (4th Dep't 1907); In re Bullard's Estate, 130 Misc. 337, 224
N. Y. Supp. 366 (Surr. Ct. 1927); Fisher v. Lister, supra note 14; see Rich v. Tiffany,
supra note 13, at 28, 37 N. Y. Supp. at 332.
In a letter written on December 11, 1933, to Professor A. G. Gulliver of Yale Law School,
Surrogate James A. Foley said: "I regard the New York rule for the computation of a
life estate as being based upon expectancy only . . . My present policy is to disregard
actual duration of life and adopt expectancy only."
11. If A wills a life interest in $100,000 to B, with remainder to charity, B receives
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died. Her expectancy was about thirty-nine years,' 8 but, had she lived ten years
until aged thirty-five, the charity would have received nothing. Therefore, if the
expectancy were used as the measure of the value of the life estate, the terms of the
will would not conflict with Section 17, and only the hospital's bankruptcy would
make paragraph six of the will applicable.
Since the court held that the actual amount received by the life tenant should
be used as the value of her interest, clearly less than one-half of the total value of
the estate, the further questions remain of the proper distribution of the excess which
the statute barred the charity from taking, and of the one-half which bankruptcy
disabled it from accepting. The excess would normally pass by intestacy to the suc-
cessor as of the date of the decedent's death,' 9 that is, to the daughter and now to her
estate. But in this case the testator had specifically provided in the sixth paragraph
of his will that if any part of the gift to the hospital should be ineffective "for any
reason" that part should go to his intestate successors determined as of the date of
the happening of the contingency which vested the remainder in the hospital, namely,
the death of the daughter under thirty-five without issue surviving. It seems probable
that the testator was contemplating a possible contest under Section 17, and, desiring
to keep his estate for his own blood relatives, inserted this provision in order to
exclude the husband of the daughter ° His intestate successors when the daughter
died were the sister, niece, and nephew, and consequently they should have been
allowed the excess over one-half of the total estate measured at the testator's death.
The court, however, gave this half to the husband, who was the distributee of the
daughter, the intestate successor at the time of the testator's death.
The effect of the bankruptcy of the hospital was to vest in the intestate successors
in existence at the death of the daughter, the entire amount that the hospital would be
permitted to receive under Section 17, in addition to the excess not permitted to be
bequeathed to charity, which should have gone, as already indicated, to the sister,
niece and nephew. If the son-in-law or the other relatives had not been permitted
to contest the gift, or if it were found that Section 17 had not been violated, the
whole will would stand, and the entire residuary estate would now pass, because
of the bankruptcy, to the sister, niece, and nephew to the exclusion of the son-in-law.
It appears, therefore, that under any interpretation of the law the husband was not
entitled to share in the estate, since, as indicated, he was not entitled to the part
of the gift to the hospital which Section 17 invalidated, nor to the valid part which
became ineffective by virtue of the bankruptcy of the hospital.
(if the customary 5% be taken as the interest rate) $5,000 a year during his life. If his
expectancy is 5 years, the present value of his interest is about $21,645, while the present
value of the remainderman's $100,000 due in 5 years is about $78,355. In this case the
statute would be violated. If B's expectancy is about 14 /s years, the value of his expected
annuity is just $50,000, or one-half the estate. In this case, or if B's expectancy is greater
than 14% years, the statute is not violated, and the terms of the will may be followed
exactly.
18. VANCE, HANDBOOK OF T LAW OF INSuRM CE (2nd ed. 1930) 975; THE WORLD
Ax.arAiAC (1934) 291.
19. In re De Lamar's Estate, 118 Misc. 127, 192 N. Y. Supp. 412 (Surr. Ct. 1922);
In re Suydam's Estate, supra note 14; In re Mosley's Estate, 138 Misc. 847, 247 N. Y. Supp.
520 (Surr. Ct. 1931); In re Sloat's Will, supra note 8. But cf. Matter of Runk, supra
note 14 (the excess goes into the residue to make up for deficiency); It re Smaliman's
Estate, supra note 5 (excess goes to compensate disappointed legatees for abated portions
of their legacies).
20. That the testator did not desire his son-in-law to share is corroborated by the fact
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POWER OF A FEDERAL COURT RECEIVER TO REMOVE UNDER SECTION 33 OF THE
JUDIcL CODE
AT common law, a receiver could not be sued in his official capacity without the
previous permission of the court appointing him.' Pursuant to that rule, federal
courts either drew to themselves suits against their appointed receivers, or designated
the court in which they might be sued. In 1888, however, a federal statute provided
that federal receivers could be sued without previous leave of the appointing court.2
Thereafter, persons suing federal receivers were free to procure an adjudication of
their claims in a state court.3 But they might still bring suit before the federal
courts not only on the regular grounds of diversity of citizenship and federal question
but also on the theory that the suit was ancillary to the main suit in which the re-
ceiver had been appointed. 4 Where the suit was instituted in a state court, a few
that by the express terms of the will the income payable to the daughter under the trust
was declared to be "free from the debts, control or interference of any husband she may
have."
1. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126 (1881); see McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U. S. 327,
330 (1891); In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 181 (1893); Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 479
(1893); HIGH, RacElvEas (1894) § 254.
2. 25 STAT. 436 (1888), 28 U. S. C. § 125 (1926). ("Every receiver or manager of any
property appointed by any court of the United States may be sued in respect of any act
or transaction of his in carrying on the business connected with such property, without
the previous leave of the court in which the receiver or manager was appointed; but
such suit shall be subject to the general equity jurisdiction of the court in which such
receiver or manager was appointed, so far as the same shall be necessary to the ends of
justice.") In the process of interpretation, the federal courts have restricted the Act of
1888 to suits involving only some "act or transaction" of the receiver in carrying on the
business which the court has put under his management. Thus suits for the recovery
of property in the hands of a receiver are held not to concern any "act or transaction"
of the receiver, and leave to sue in such cases must be obtained. In re Tyler, supra note 1;
Coster v. Parkensburg Branch Rr. Co., 131 Fed. 115 (C. C. N. D. W. Va. 1904); Love v.
Louisville and Eastern Rr. Co., 178 Fed. 507 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1910); Dickinson v.
Willis, 239 Fed. 171 (S. D. Iowa 1916); Field v. Kansas City Refining Co., 296 Fed. 800
(C. C. A. 8th, 1924); Chapman, Suits against Federal Equity Receivers (1927) 13 VA. L.
REv. 345, 349. For a similar reason, causes of action arising previous to the inauguration
of a receivership are not maintainable without the previous permission of the court
appointing the federal receiver. State of Oklahoma v. State of Texas, 265 U. S. 490,
492 (1924); Central Trust Co. v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co., 59 Fed. 523 (C. C.
S. D. Ky. 1894). But see Hall v. Wilson, 35 F. (2d) 189 (N. D. Tex. 1929). Suits against
an incumbent receiver for causes of action arising under his predecessor in office are,
however, maintainable without the previous leave of the appointing court. McNulta v.
Lochridge, supra note 1. Finally, while the issues decided in a case properly tried in
a state court cannot thereafter be reopened, the time and mode of payment of the judg-
ment secured is designated solely by the federal court appointing the receiver. Texas and
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 151 U. S. 81 (1894); Wilcox v. Jones, 177 ,Fed. 870 (C. C. A.
4th, 1910); Dale v. Smith, 182 Fed. 360 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1910).
3. Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593 (1892); White v. Ewing, 159 U. S.
36 (1895); Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur and Evansville Ry. Co., 179 U. S. 335, 342
(1900); Betts v. Bisher, 213 Fed. 581 (C. C. A. 9th, 1914); Cobb v. Sertic, 218 Fed. 320
(C. C. A. 6th, 1914).
4. White v. Ewing, supra note 3; Pope v. Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Ry. Co.,
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courts therefore permitted removal by the federal receiver upon the ground that the
suit was ancillary to the main proceeding. 5 A more general method of removal, how-
ever, was that under the general removal statute upon the grounds of diversity of
citizenship 7 or federal question. For a time, the lower federal courts, apparently
following a dictum in a Supreme Court decision s construed suits against federal
receivers as involving a federal question, for the sole reason that the receiver
had been appointed under a federal court order.9 Thus, a federal receiver could
remove virtually at will under the general removal statute. The Supreme Court,
however, reversed that trend of decision by holding that the mere fact that a federal
receiver was a party to the suit did not raise a federal question;' 0 federal receivers
were reduced to the status of ordinary persons sued in state courts insofar as the
removal privilege was concerned. Later, a new possibility of removal was afforded
federal receivers by the 1916 amendment to Section 33 of the Judicial Code"l
which provided that an "officer of the courts of the United States" could remove a
suit commenced against him in a state court "for or on account of any act done
under color of his office or in the performance of his duties as such officer."' 2
173 U. S. 573 (1899); Stancliff v. Hendricks, 123 Fed. 744 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1901); Glen-
wood Irrigation Co. v. Vallery, 248 Fed. 483 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918); Hume v. City of New
York, 255 Fed. 488 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
S. Carpenter v. Northern Pacific Rr. Co., 75 Fed. 850 (C. C. D. Wash. 1896); Sulli-
van v. Barnard, 81 Fed. 886 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1897). But see Pitkin v. Cowen, 91 Fed.
599 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1899); Gilmore v. Herrick, 93 Fed. 525 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1899).
It would seem that removal by a federal receiver upon the ground that the suit is
ancillary to the suit in which he was appointed would be more properly denied. The
removal privilege is a purely statutory one [DoBIE, FzE AL JunsDicTioN AND PROCEDURE
(1928) at 347] and no provision in any removal statute justified removal of an ancillary
suit. Removals under Section 2 of the general removal statute [25 STAT. 433 (1888), 28
U. S. C. § 71 (1926)], are expressly limited to cases in which the federal trial court has
original, not ancillary, jurisdiction by Section 1 of the act.
6. Note 5, supra.
7. In determining whether diversity of citizenship exists in a suit against a federal
receiver it is the receiver's personal domicile, rather than that of the corporation he is
managing, that is determinative of the defendant's citizenship. See Farlow v. Lea, Fed.
Cas. No. 4,649 at 1017 (N. D. Ohio 1877); Davies v. Lathrop, 12 Fed. 353 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1882); Brisenden v. Chamberlain, 53 Fed. 307 (C. C. D. S. C. 1892); Smith v.
Rackliffe, 87 Fed. 964 (C. C. A. 9th, 1893).
8. Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cox, supra note 3, at 603.
9. Evans v. Dillingham, 43 Fed. 177 (C. C. N. D. Tex. 1890); Central Trust Co. of
New York v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co., supra note 3; Jewett v. Whitcomb, 69 Fed.
417 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1895); Landers v. Felton, 73 Fed. 311 (C. C. D. Ky. 1896); Keihl
v. City of South Bend, 76 Fed. 921 (C. C. A. 9th, 1896); Lund v. Chicago, R. I. and P.
Ry. Co., 78 Fed. 385 (C. C. D. Neb. 1897); Board of Commissioners of Van Wert County
v. Pierce, 90 Fed. 764 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1898); Tompkins v. MacLeod, 96 Fed. 927
(C. C. D. Ky. 1899). Contra: Marrs v. Felton, 102 Fed. 775 (C. C. D. Ky. 1900).
10. Gableman v, Peoria, Decatur and Evansville Ry. Co., supra note 3.
11. 39 STAT. 532 (1916), 28 U. S. C § 76 (1926).
12. The differences in the removal procedure between Section 33 and Section 28, which
is the general removal section, are very marked. Under Section 28, it is necessary in
order to sustain a removal that diversity of citizenship or a federal question be involved
in a suit where the amount in controversy exceeds $3000. If removal is upon the ground
of federal question, the facts revealing such must appear in the complaint. Walker v.
Lower federal courts unanimously agreed that a receiver was an officer of the
court,13 and therefore within the purview of the act. They disagreed, however,
as to when a suit against a federal receiver concerned an act done "in the perform-
ance of his duties." Upon the one hand it was contended that, either when engaged
in activities in which he might incur personal liability, or when acting in a purely
representative capacity,14 the receiver was performing duties imposed upon him by
the court. It was therefore held that a suit relating to either situation was properly
removable under Section 33.15 On the other hand, it was maintained that Congress
intended to limit the removal privilege to those proceedings in which the attempt was
made to subject the federal receiver to personal liability.' 6
In a recent case, a suit was brought in a state court against the federal receiver of
a railroad to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's son caused by the alleged
negligence of an employee of the receiver in the operation of a train. Lacking the
requisite diversity of citizenship or federal question to sustain a removal under the
general removal section, the receiver invoked Section 33 to effect that result. The
district court permitted the removal,17 but upon appeal from a judgment against
the plaintiffs, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and ordered a remand to the
state court.1 s The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals. 19 It held that Section 33 does not extend federal receivers' right of removal
to suits arising from the operation, through agents, of a business intrusted to their
care. The express basis of the decision was that Congress did not intend to authorize
that type of removal under Section 33.
That Congress did not intend the amendment to reach federal receivers sued in
their representative capacity, is readily deducible from the dissimilarity between the
functions of federal receivers and those of persons admittedly within the section,
viz. federal revenue officers, officers of congress engaged in executing its orders, and
marshals of the United States courts. The duties of these officers distinctly involve
Collins, 167 U. S. 57 (1897); Mayo v. Dockery, 108 Fed. 897 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1901).
Furthermore, under that section petition for removal together with a bond, must be filed
in the state court before the time set for answer. But under Section 33, those conditions
are eliminated. The petition for removal can be filed at any time before trial in a state
court; the facts showing that the suit involves a federal question need not appear in the
complaint; and no minimum jurisdictional amount is required.
13. It has long been held by the courts of the United States that a receiver is an
officer of the court appointing him. See Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322, 331 (U. S. 1854);
Stuart v. Boulware, 133 U. S. 78, 81 (1890); Union Bank of Chicago v. Kansas City Bank,
136 U. S. 223 (1890); Porter v. Sabin, supra note 1, at 479; Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman,
208 U. S. 360, 370 (1908) ; RXG, op. cit. supra note 1, § 254.
14. When operating a business for the court the federal receiver's "misfeasances, negli-
gence, and liabilities are official and not personal." McNulta v. Lochridge, supra note 1,
at 332; Porter v. Sabin, supra note 1, at 479; Hanlon v. Smith, 175 Fed. 192 (C. C. N. D.
Iowa 1909); Smith v. Jones Lumber and Mercantile Co., 200 Fed. 647 (W. D. Wis. 1912).
15. Matarazzo v. Hustis, 256 Fed. 882 (N. D. N. Y. 1919); American Locomotive Co.
v. Histed, 18 F. (2d) 656 (W. D. Mo. 1926); Berens v. Byram, 26 F. (2d) 953 (D. S.
D. 1927); Thompson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 5 F. Supp. 785 (N. D. Okla.
1934).
16. Slover v. Chicago, M. and St. Paul Ry. Co., 16 F. (2d) 609 (W. D. Mo. 1926);
Ruff v. Gay, 67 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. Sth, 1933).
17. Ruff v. Gay, 3 F. Supp. 264 (S. D. Ga. 1933).
18. Ruff v. Gay, supra note 16.
19. Ruff v. Gay, 54 Sup. Ct. 608 (1934).
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the execution of recognized governmental functions. 20 But, although the receiver
is acting under the authority of the federal court which appointed him, his duties
usually involve little more than the operation of a private business. In that respect
his function approximates that of a business executive, rather than that of a govern-
mental officer, and warrants no exemption from the ordinarily applicable state court
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the clear motivation of Congress in allowing removal of
criminal and civil suits against federal revenue officers or officers of congress who
alone could remove prior to the amendment of 1916, would appear to be lacking in
the case of suits against federal receivers. The purpose was to prevent an undue
interference with the functions of those officers21 which had previously resulted from
the prosecution of criminal and civil suits against federal officers in unfriendly state
courts.22 And Congress deemed it necessary to provide against the repetition of that
situation. No such danger, however, was or is apprehended from private suits against
federal equity receivers. The absence of intention to include federal receivers
within the amendment is further evidenced by the fact that an extension of the
removal privilege under Section 33 to such receivers would virtually nullify Section
66 of the Judicial Code. 23 The latter section authorizes suits to be brought against
federal receivers without previous leave of the appointing court. Its obvious design
was to permit suits to be tried in state courts which might otherwise be litigated
in the federal courts. 24  It is apparent that to enable receivers to remove on their
own volition would tend completely to emasculate Section 66 and defeat its purpose.
In view of the facts that Congress had never, previous to the amendment of 1916,
expressed a desire to repeal Section 66, and that no particular necessity for so doing
had been revealed, 25 it is all the more reasonable to conclude that Congress did not
intend to nullify Section 66 by extending the removal privilege to federal receivers
through the amendment of 1916. The general tendency of Congress to restrict the
jurisdiction of the federal courts 26 fortifies this conclusion.
This line of reasoning would be equally applicable to deny the privilege of removal
under Section 33 to federal receivers where it is sought to hold them responsible in
20. Only when the acts for which, those officers stand accused are done in the line of
their duties as such officers are they accorded the privilege of removal under § 33. Mary-
land v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9 (1926); Colorado v. Symes, 286 U. S. 510 (1932); State of
Illinois v. Fletcher, 22 Fed. 776 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1884); State of Florida v. Huston, 283
Fed. 687 (S. D. Fla. 1922).
21. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 (1879); see DoBrn, op. cit. supra note 6, at 395;
Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts (1928)
13 Coarx. L. Q. 499, 508; Strayhorn, Immunity of Federal Officers from State Prosecution
(1928) 6 No. CAR. L. Rxv. 123.
22. See Strayhorn, ibid.
23. Note 2, supra.
24. Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur and Evansville Ry. Co., supra note 4, at 338.
25. But see Matarazzo v. Hustis, supra note 15, at 890.
26. That restrictive policy is reflected in a steady stream of federal legislation from
1887 to 1925. See Frankfurter, supra note 21. It may be argued, of course, that while
the general tendency of Congress may be to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal trial
courts, an anomalous and undesirable situation may have prompted Congress slightly to
broaden that jurisdiction as a means of eliminating that condition. This argument, how-
ever, cannot be availed of by federal receivers for the reason that no manifest evil neces-
sitated elimination. But that such was the case insofar as United States Marshals were
concerned, see Report of Judiciary Committee of the House, H. R. R.np. No. 776, 64th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1915) 53 CONG. Rnc. 9442.
[Vol. 43
their own persons or property. In absence of a demonstrated need for removal
privileges arising out of the special character or consequences of personal suits
against them, the exclusion of federal receivers from the Congressional intent under
Section 33 would be complete. The issue, however, was not before the court in the
principal case and hence not settled. 27 But since the vast majority of suits are
directed against receivers in their official capacities rather than their personal capaci-
ties, the Supreme Court's confinement to the holding that federal receivers, sued in
their official capacities, may not remove under Section 33 is hardly the less effective
to restrict federal receivers to the state courts, and in so doing to foreclose a possi-
ble source of prolific federal litigation. And that result is, in itself, highly justifiable
in view of the desirability of relieving the overcrowded dockets of the federal trial
courts.
2 8
ADEQUACY OF SECURITY FOR JUST COMPENSATION IN MUNICIPAL EMINENT
DoAIN PROCEEDINGS
THE capacity of the state to acquire private property for public use by the exercise
of its power of eminent domain is said to be an inherent incident of governmental sov-
ereignty; 1 but the application of the power is subject to certain limitations imposed
by both state and federal constitutions and by judicial construction. Perhaps the
most significant qualification is the constitutional requirement that just compensa-
tion be paid to the individual whose property is taken.2 It is obvious that the de-
termination of what constitutes a just compensation, and its method of payment,
gives rise to problems not susceptible to a simple disposition, and must depend
largely on the circumstances of the particular case; the resulting interpretations
have been universally swayed in large measure by a desire to afford to the owner of
private property the maximum of protection consistent with a recognition of the
sovereign power to condemn.3
A striking delimitation of the concept of just compensation appears in a recent
New Hampshire case.4 A village district sought to condemn the property of an
electric lighting company, acting under a statute which provided that both possession
27. The court intimated, however, that it would decline to permit a removal by federal
receivers under § 33 even when sued personally.
28. See Frankfurter and Landis, Business of the Supreme Court of the United States-
A Study in the Federal Judicial System (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 834.
1. See Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 406 (1878; United States v. Jones, 109
U. S. 513, 518 (1883) ; United States v. Campbell, 5 F. Supp. 156, 171 (S. D. N. Y. 1933),
noted in (1934) 43 YALE, L. J. 497; 1 Lnwis, EmnLUN T Doam (3d ed. 1909) 1-7.
2. The limitation upon the power of the federal government is expressed in the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, providing that ". . . nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." Similar provisions are said to exist in every
state constitution, except those of New Hampshire and North Carolina. MICIGAN JUDIC
CoUNcIL, EINT= DOMAI (1931) 56. And in these states the same result has been
reached through judicial construction of "due process" clauses. Staton v. Norfolk and
Carolina Rr. Co., 111 N. C. 278, 16 S. E. 181 (1892); In re Opinion of the Justices, 66
N. H. 629, 33 Atl. 1076 (1891). It has been suggested that even without a constitutional
stipulation the requirement of just compensation would be imposed by the dictates of natural
justice. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain (1931) 6
Wis. L. REv. 67.
3. 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DomIsN (2d ed. 1917) § 1.
4. Goodrich Falls Electric Co. v. Howard, 171 AtI. 761 (N. H. 1934).
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and title should pass to the condemnor before payment of compensation when the
value of the property was in dispute.5 The utility brought a bill to enjoin the con-
demnation proceedings on the ground that the financial condition of the condemnor
was so unsound as to give no proper security for payment of the final award, and
that the statute authorizing the condemnation was therefore confiscatory. It ap-
peared that the municipal power to tax and to borrow might be insufficient to meet
the award of compensation which would subsequently be made. The court accord-
ingly granted the injunction, holding that the usual presumption of the sound credit
of a municipality was non-existent in the present economic situation, and that the
security for compensation to the utility was not sufficiently certain to permit a taking
of the property.
Both the manner and time of making payment of a compensation award are
usually determined by express constitutional provisions which, of course, are con-
trolling.6 Some such provisions require in all cases a complete determination of the
issue of value, and payment of the final award, prior to any taking of the property.
7
Others draw a distinction between a taking by the state and a taking by a private
corporation, empowered by statute to condemn, requiring prepayment only by the
latter.8 In still other jurisdictions there is offered the alternative of prepayment or
the giving of adequate security in all cases to the condemnee. 9 When a private
corporation is permitted to acquire property merely upon providing security, it
would seem that such a taking is violative of the requirement of just compensation,' 0
unless the security offered is sufficient beyond any doubt.1 For the condemnee
should not be compelled to resort to an action at law to secure a judgment against
a corporation, whose financial structure may prove inadequate. However, it has been
held in the case of a private taking that a deposit in court, pending appeal, of double
the amount awarded by commissioners is adequate security.'2 Likewise, a statute
which provided that damages should be paid by the private corporation "or secured
to be paid upon such terms and conditions as the county auditor may deem just
and proper" has been held valid. 13 But a statute which fails to provide any means
of obtaining compensation other than out of a fixed sum appropriated for the
5. N. H. PuB. LAws (1926) c. 44, § 11.
6. Redman v. The Philadelphia, Marlton & Medford Rr. Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 165 (1880);
2 Lawis, op. cit. stpra note 1, § 676.
7. ALA. CosT., Art. 1, § 23; CAL. CoxsT., Art. 1, § 14; COL. CONST., Art. 2, § 15; GA.
CoxsT., Art. 1, § 3, par. 1; IDAHO CONST., Art. 1, § 14; Ky. CONST., Art. 1, § 13; LA.
CoNsT., Art. 167; MD. CONST., Art. 3, § 40; Miss. CoST., Art. 3, § 17; Mo. CoNST,, Art. 2,
§ 21; MONT. CONST., Art. 3, § 14; Nav. CoNsT., Art. 1, § 8; N. D. CONST., Art. 1, § 14.
8. IND. CoAsT., Art. 1, § 21; KAN. CoNsT., Art. 12, § 4; Omio CONST., Art. 13, § 5;
WASH. CONsT., Art. 1, § 16.
9. This provision is applicable both to the state and to private corporations. IowA
CoAsT., Art. 1, § 18; McH. CoNsT., Art. 15, §§ 9, 15; MINN. CONsT., Art. 1, § 13; PA.
CoNsT., Art. 1, § 10; S. D. CONST., Art. 17, § 18. In a few states it is applicable only to
private corporations. ARK. CoNsT., Art. 12, § 9; FLA. CoNsT., Art. 16, § 29; ORE. CoNsT.,
Art. 11, § 14; S. C. CONST., Art. 9, § 20; TEx. CONS?., Art. 1, § 17; W. VA. CONST., Art. 3,
§ 9.
10. People ex rel. Hesterman v. Smart, 333 Ill. 135, 164 N. E. 171 (1928) ; see Meyers
v. City of Alma, 117 Neb. 511, 513, 221 N. W. 438, 439 (1928); 2 COOLEY, CONSTrrUTIONAL
LnnTATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 1205; 2 LEwis, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 678, 681.
11. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U. S. 641 (1890).
12. Ibid.
13. Sisson v. Board of Supervisors, 128 Iowa 442, 104 N. W. 454 (1905).
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purpose14 or by means of a bond with sureties for a fixed amount' 5 does not satisfy
the constitutional requirement, since the determination of the amount of com-
pensation is not a legislative but a judicial function' 6 and the fixed amount may prove
to be inadequate. Also a deposit of no more than the award, to remain in court
until final judgment on appeal, has been held insufficient security on the ground
that the award might subsequently be materially increased.
17
When private property is taken by the state or by any municipal corporation acting
under authority from the state, in the absence of an express constitutional provision
to the contrary, payment of the compensation, under the usual veiw, need not precede
either the entry upon the land or the passing of title.'8 But the concept of security
to the condemnee still obtains.19 The result, however, must necessarily be dis-
tinguished from that reached where the taking is by a private corporation, since pay-
ment of the compensation is here ordinarily a public obligation, and it is assumed
that the property of the state or municipality is a fund to which resort may be had
without risk of loss. Accordingly, the credit of the public is by itself alone adequate
security, and to require a condemnee to rely upon that security is not a confiscation.
20
The presumption of soundness of the public credit has been held, however, to be
rebutted by proof that the resources of the municipality were insufficient to enable
it to make compensation within a reasonable time.21 Moreover, if the terms of the
statute authorizing the condemnation are such as not to make the payment of the
compensation a public charge, the soundness of the public credit becomes an irrel-
evant factor and security in some other form must be provided.22 This result has
been reached in one instance where a condemnation statute directed the payment
of compensation out of the earnings of a railroad owned by the state. Even
though it was admitted that the earnings would be ample for payment, it was held
that such a provision did not supply a sufficiently certain security to satisfy the con-
stitutional requirement.23 Where compensation is to be made only out of a par-
ticular appropriation for that purpose, it is likewise not a public charge; and if there
14. State v. McCook, 109 Conn. 621, 147 AtI. 126 (1929).
15. Brewster v. J. & J. Rogers Co., 169 N. Y. 73, 62 N. E. 164 (1901).
16. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 327 (1892).
17. Harrisburg, Carlisle & Chambersburg Turnpike Road Co. v. Harrisburg & Mechan-
icsburg Electric Ry. Co., 177 Pa. 585, 35 Atl. 850 (1896).
18. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380 (1895); United States v. McIntosh, 2 F. Supp. 244
(E. D. Va. 1932).
19. City of San Antonio v. Astoria, 67 S. W. (2d) 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). When
the United States takes property it impliedly contracts to pay out of the public funds.
United States v. Campbell, supra note 1; cf. Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft,
224 U. S. 290 (1911).
20. An extreme result of this doctrine is presented in In re City of Cedar Rapids, 85
Iowa 39, 51 N. W. 1142 (1892) where it was held no defence in condemnation proceedings
by a city that the city had at the time no funds with which to pay for the land and that
because of its obligation under the award it would incur an indebtedness in excess of the
constitutional limit.
21. Keene v. Bristol, 26 Pa. 46 (1856).
22. But there seems to be a tendency to construe condemnation statutes as pledging the
full faith and credit of the public even where mention of a specific fund is made. Cf.
Liberty Central Trust Co. v. Greenbrier College for Women, 50 F. (2d) 424 (S. D. W. Va.
1931), aff'd, 238 U. S. 800 (1931).
23. Connecticut River Rr. Co. v. County Commissioners of Franklin, 127 Mass. 50
(1879).
is a deficiency in the amount of the appropriation, the property may not be taken.24
In the present case the statute authorizing the condemnation provided for no se-
curity other than the public credit. Traditionally, this would have been sufficient.
But the court took judicial cognizance of the present prevailing condition of economic
uncertainty and concluded that present circumstances required an additional mea-
sure of protection in order to sustain the concept of adequate security. This addi-
tional measure was recognized in holding that the presumption of the soundness
of public credit could not constitutionally be one of law, but only the result of a
factual situation, and that the situation now no longer warranted the existence of
the presumption. Such a conclusion seems under the circumstances manifestly in
accord with the purpose of the requirement of just compensation. But the result
reached suggests a serious qualification on the power of municipal corporations to
acquire property by condemnation, since many cities may, in the present state of
affairs, be unable to provide the requisite degree of further security.
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE UNDER THE N.R.A. CODES
THm practice of retail price cutting, which seems to have begun late in the nineteenth
century, has increased continually with the development and expansion of department
and chain stores, and mail order houses.' During this period, well advertised trade
names have replaced the retailer's personal assurance as criteria of quality,2 and the
result has been economic warfare between the manufacturer, attempting to maintain
high prices in the sale of his article, and the more ambitious retailers, who have
found in quick turnovers and "loss leaders" the means to larger profits. 3 Manufac-
turers and vendors of trade-marked products have tried the devices of licensing,4
consigning,5 contracts to sell at fixed prices,6 threats of refusal to deliver,7 and the
assistance of trade associations8 in order to maintain the price level of their products
24. Miller v. United States, 57 F. (2d) 424 (App. D. C. 1932).
1. UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE COMMiSION, REPORT ON REsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
(Part I, 1929), 45.
2. Id. at 18.
3. UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE CoararIssIoN, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
(Part II, 1931) 8, 10, 13.
4. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339 (1907); Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1
(1912); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490 (1917).
5. Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911); United States v.
General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 (1926).
6. Boston Store v. American Gramaphone Co., 246 U. S. 8 (1918); U. S. v. Schrader's
Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920); John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24
(C. C. A. 6th, 1907); J. W. Kobi v. Federal Trade Commission, 23 F. (2d) 41 (C.
C. A. 2nd, 1927). Some manufacturers have attempted to enforce a requirement of price
tags on articles. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, supra note 4; Bauer v. O'Donnell, supra
note 4.
7. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441 (1922);
Hills Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission, 9 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); Moir v.
Federal Trade Commission, 12 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926); Q. R. S. Music Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 12 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926); Cream of Wheat Co.
v. Federal Trade Commission, 14 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
8. Straus v. American Publishers' Association, 231 U. S. 222 (1913); American Tobacco
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 9 F. (2d) 571 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1925).
1332 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
1934] NOTES
and to make them profitable items in the retailer's stock.9 Legal interference, how-
ever, has contributed to the failure of these methodsl o and the conflicting interests
of the consumer, wholesaler, manufacturer, "cut-rater," and smaller retailer have
remained in a state of economic anarchy.'"
The courts have consistently ignored the social problem and the economic inter-
ests at stake.' 2 Guided by precedent to the effect that no man may distrain the use
of personalty after transferring title,' 3 and aided by the anti-trust laws,14 they have
held all agreements to maintain price levels illegal.15 But they have also recognized
as equally good common law that an owner may choose his customers.16 The
product has been a play on words rather than a frank recognition of the difficulty.
1 7
Courts have said the manufacturer may refuse to sell to price cutters and inform
them of his intention.' s But he may not sign contracts for price fixing,' 9 inquire
through agents or other dealers to discover those who use his product as a loss
leader,20 keep a list of offenders, 21 or employ any mark of identification to trace the
9. See UmTE STATEs FEDEPAL ThAsn ComMssIoN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 141, 149, 163.
10. See cases cited supra, notes 4-7. But see Ayer, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,'
15 F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1926), cert. den. 273 U. S. 759 (1927); American Tobacco
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 8.
11. See note 3, supra.
12. "Whether a producer of goods should be permitted to fix by contract, express or
implied, the price at which the purchaser may resell them, and if so, under what conditions,
is an economic question. To decide it wisely, it is necessary to consider the relevant facts,
industrial and commercial, rather than established legal principles." Brandeis, J., in Boston
Store v. American Gramaphone Co., supra note 6, at 27, 28.
13. Adams v. Burke, 84 U. S. 453 (1873); Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons Co.,
supra note 5, at 405; Bauer v. O'Donnell, supra note 4, at 17; Straus v. Victor Talking
Machine Co., supra note 4, at 501; See United States v. General Electric Co., supra note 5,
at 489. But see Bitterman v. Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co., 207 U. S. 205 (1907).
14. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1926), Sherman Act; 38 STAT. 719 (1914),
15 U. S. C. § 45 (1926), Federal Trade Commission Act.
15. See note 6, sura; Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons Co., supra note 5, at 411,
Holmes, J. dissenting ("There is no statute covering the case; there is no body of prece-
dent that by ineluctable logic requires the conclusion to which the court has come.").
16. Federal Trade Commission v. Raymond Co., 263 U. S. 565, 73 (1924); Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1915);
cf. Eastern States Lumber Association v. United States, 234 U. S. 600 (1914). For a
discussion of the history of this law, see Waite, Public Poliy and Personal Opinion (1921)
19 MicH. L. REy. 265; Note (1927) 75 U. or PA. L. REv. 248.
17. See Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 520 (1917) (Holmes, J.
dissenting); cf. United States v. General Electric Co., supra note 5.
18. United States v. Colgate, 250 U. S. 300 (1919); see Hills Brothers v. Federal Trade
Commission, supra note 7, at 485; Toledo Pipe Threading Machine Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 11 F. (2d) 337, 342 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926); Cream of Wheat Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, supra note 7, at 50.
19. See note 6, supra.
20. Oppenbeim, Obendorf and Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, S F. (2d) 574
(C. C. A. 4th, 1925) ; and cases cited note 7, supra.
21. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech Nut Packing Co., supra note 7; Oppenheim
Obendorf and Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 20; i Bros. v. Federal
Trade Commission, supra note 7.
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source by which the cut-rate dealer obtained his product.22  The distinction, however,
between an agreement to maintain prices, a mere suggestion that the price be main-
tained, and virtual agreements cannot be clearly made in terms of the social facts;23
the matter still occupies the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts.2 4
Although the Supreme Court has refused to pass on the subject of resale price
maintenance, for a number of years the lower courts have continued to condemn the
practice. Thus, in a recent case, the Sheaffer Pen Co. was enjoined by a federal
district court from proceeding further in the state courts against a "cut-rate" drug
store, selling Sheaffer pens from which the maker's serial number had been buffed
out with consequent damage to the pens; the ground given to sustain the injunction
was that the state court suit was intended to aid the pen company in unlawfully
restraining trade and competition by maintaining price levels.25 In its anxiety to
enforce a dubious policy, the court apparently ignored the fact that in selling seriously
damaged merchandise, and misrepresenting to the public that it was a guaranteed
pen, the petitioners entered a court of equity with unclean hands.26
The advent of the N.R.A. and the retailer's codes pursuant to it, offer little con-
structive relief to the manufacturer or consumer, and their effect has been further
curtailed by at least one court.2r Under the provisions of the Code of Fair Compe-
tition of the Retail Trade and the various retail codes, "loss leaders,"28 adver-
tisements of a cut-rate policy,2 9 and sales below cost are prohibited30 But when
a manufacturer brought an action to enjoin the petitioner in the above case from
selling his electrical machines below cost, the court denied that the defendant had
violated his code, since he was selling only below replacement cost.3 ' In refusing
22. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., supra note 7; see also Katz
Drug Co. v. W. A. Sheaffer Pen Co., 6 F. Supp. 212, 213 (W. D. Mo. 1933).
23. See United States v. Schrader's Sons Inc., supra note 6, at 100; United States v.
Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co., 222 Fed. 725 (E. D. Mich. 1915); Toledo Pipe Thread-
ing Machine Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 18, at 342; Moir v. Federal
Trade Commission, supra note 7, at 28; Q. R. S. Music Co. v. Federal Trade Commission
supra note 7, at 733.
24. UN=TED STATES FozDEasr TRADE ComnssioN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 109.
25. Katz Drug Co. v. W. A. Sheaffer Pen Co., supra note 22.
26. These facts appear from a complaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission
against the W. A. Sheaffer Pen Co. (Docket No. 2158, 1934, p. 3) and the answer of
the Pen Co. filed March 22, 1934 (supra, at p. 4).
27. Chicago Flexible Shaft Co. v. Katz Drug Co. 6 F. Supp. 193 (D. C. Del. 1934).
28. CODE or FAmR COmPETiOaN FOR Tim RETAnl TRADE, (1933) art. VIII; CODE OF
FAiR CoMY=ETrnON FOR THE RETAiL DRUG TADn (1933) art. VII.
29. CODE OF FAnT Co-aoro :FOR rTE RETAIL TRADE, (1933) art. IX, § 1 c.
30. The provisions of the drug code seem to have been inadequate, being ineffective to
prevent selling below cost by the small dealer. It was modified on March 29, 1934 by art.
VIII, § 6 which prohibits sales below the manufacturer's wholesale list price per dozen
items.
31. Chicago Flexible Shaft Co. v. Katz Drug Co., supra note 27. The complainant,
manufacturer of the article, waged a price war with the defendant who sold his
"Mixmasters" at a reduced price, by ordering other dealers to undersell at his expense.
After driving the defendant to reduce his price below the original wholesale price,
complainant brought this suit. The defendant showed that the plaintiff's activities made
it possible for him to buy the machines below the price at which he was retailing it. It
is difficult to understand why the "loss leader" clause of the codes did not apply since it
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the plaintiff's request that the defendant be forced to sell at the retail list price,
the court apparently accorded practices of cut throat competition the sanction of
public policy; it noted that the attempt of the plaintiff to maintain such a price
would constitute restraint of trade.32
It is unfortunate that during a period of unusual social change through govern-
mental enactment no more desirable solution has been found.33 The consumer's re-
liance on trade names in the hope of purchasing trustworthy products,3 4 has raised
the price of these articles far beyond their value without labels;35 but the manufac-
turer must keep the prices high to maintain their prestige, and to encourage their
sale by the retailer. 36 On the other hand, the consumer cannot be expected to buy at
a price higher than he need pay; and it is certain that some enterprising middleman
will be found ready to profit by the situation. Thus the conflicting interests of vari-
ous economic groups jeopardize money invested in advertisements, the interests of
the small retailer who requires a larger percent profit, the wholesaler, and the con-
sumer. The attitude of the law has in the past, been "laissez-faire;" and the present
codes are inadequate, since they merely prohibit the relatively rare incident of cutting
prices below cost,3 7 and that, only in particular industries. Recent judicial treat-
ment, moreover, threatens to make the codes completely abortive in this respect by
the narrow interpretation of provisions, and the insistence that only the government
may prosecute under the N,R.A.38 If the situation would be remedied, a more
thorough governmental policy, extending beyond mere price maintenance would seem
necessary to decrease the waste of advertisement which is finally charged to the con-
sumer,39 to give the retailer a fair profit or eliminate the "inefficient" small shop, and
to guaranty to the public that it is purchasing honest and unmisrepresented values
at a fair price.
40
includes in the cost of the item an allowance for store wages. Furthermore, it does not
seem that a "loss leader" need constitute a sale below cost or that it refers to replacement
cost. The court might also have found a violation of the advertisement clause of the code,
supra note 29, since the defendant had advertised its cut-rate policy.
The court cited Purvis v. Bazemore, S F. Supp. 230, 232, which decided, inter alia, that
an individual member of an industry could not maintain action against another under the
code; that the enforcement of the N.RA. was solely a governmental privilege. The court's
interpretation of the N.R.A., 15 U. S. C. SurP. VII § 703c (1933), seems doubtful since it
does not explicitly or implicitly reserve the right of prosecution to the government.
32. 15 U. S. C. Supp. VII § 705 (1933) exempts codes, agreements and licenses from the
operation of anti-trust laws. It does not however, appear here that the plaintiff was under
the N.R.A.
33. With the exception of the CODE or FAIR CoMPETITo rOR THE PETROLEiM INDUS-
TnsR (1933) art. 5 rule 26, it seems no code provides for resale price maintenance, although
a number of proposed codes contained such provisions. MAYERs, A HANDBoox OF N.R-A.
(2d ed. 1934) § 364.
34. Such reliance has generally proved unjustified. See note 2, supra; CHASE AND
ScErLiNx, YOUR MoY's WORTH (1928); KALLET AND Sc:Inxic, 100,000,000 GUINEA PIGS
(1933).
35. UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE CoMM ssION, op. cit. supra note 3, at 159; CHASE,
THE EcONOMY oF ABUNDANCE (1934) 159-165.
36. See note 9, supra.
37. UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE COMmissION, op. cit. supra note 3, at 4.
38. See note 31, supra.
39. See UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE COmMISSION, op. cit. supra note 3, at 3, 20-33.
40. See note 34, supra; Schlink, Safeguarding the Consumer's Interest (1934) 172 ANN.
Am. AcAD. 113; see also generally, the whole of volume 173 of the same publication.
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PAYMENT Or DIVIDENDS FROM WASTING ASSET CORPORATION TO INCOME Or TRUST
RATHER THAN CoRus
By the terms of a living trust in a recent New Jersey case,1 the settlor directed pay-
ment to his daughter during her lifetime of the income arising from the corpus of
the trust, which consisted of stock in a copper mining company; at her death the in-
come was to be paid to a subsequent life tenant, with the remainder over to other
specified persons. Subsequent to the settlor's death, dividends were declared on the
stock out of a depletion reserve, representing the value of ore extracted from the
mine. The daughter thereupon brought suit against the trustees to compel payment
to her of the dividends as "income," which claim the second life tenant and remain-
dermen contested on the ground that, since the dividends arose from the sale of ore,
which was the company's sole asset, they should be retained as part of the corpus.
It was found that the depletion reserve was a mere book entry established to decrease
income tax payments, that both the settlor and company understood "income" to in-
clude payments out of this reserve, and that the trustees had, during the settlor's
lifetime, paid similar dividends with his approval to the daughter. The court held,
therefore, that the dividends should be paid to the daughter as income, since such a
disposition would effectuate the settlor's apparent intention.
Dividends from mining and similar wasting asset corporations2 result from the sale
of capital assets. Logically, the distribution of the entire sale proceeds by this device
returns to stockholders the proportionate share of their capital investment represented
by the assets sold in addition to any profit arising from the sale. But the payment
of wasting asset dividends to a trust fund, however, is not usually treated as a return
of capital; and consequently mining,3 oil,-' lumber,5 and speculative land company0
dividends have all been held to be legitimate income which must be allocated to the
life beneficiary rather than to the trust corpus. These results may be explained in
part by the influence of the analogous treatment accorded to the earnings of the
wasting asset corporation itself. Thus the capital of such corporations has been
held not to be dissipated in violation of statutes by the declaration of dividends where
no depletion reserve had been created,7 on the ground that the capital element of the
1. De Brabant v. Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey, 113 N. J. Eq. 215, 166 AU. 533
(1933).
2. Dividends arising from corporate exploitation of patents are also termed wasting asset
dividends, but are not considered here as they do not physically represent sold assets.
Treatment of dividends of this nature may be found in Union County Trust Co. v. Gray,
110 N. J. Eq. 270, 159 At. 625 (1932); cf. Mellon v. Mississippi Wire Glass Co., 77 N. J.
Eq. 498, 78 At. 710 (1910); 2 CooK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 546.
3. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 Mass. 158, 158 N. E. 530 (1927); see Waterman's
Estate, 279 Pa. 491, 496, 497, 124 Atl. 166, 168 (1924).
4. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. McCarter, 111 N. J. Eq. 315, 162 Atl. 274 (1932).
5. Washington County Hospital Association v. Hagerstown Trust Co., 124 Md. 1, 91 Atl.
787 (1914).
6. Reed v. Head, 88 Mass. 174 (1863); Oliver's Estate, 136 Pa. 43, 20 Atl. 527 (1890);
Thomson's Estate, 153 Pa. 332, 26 Atl. 652 (1893); see Miller v. Payne, 150 Wis. 354, 378,
279, 136 N. W. 811, 819 (1912).
7. Excelsior Water and Mining Co. v. Pierce, 90 Cal. 131, 27 Pac. 44 (1891); Lee v.
Neuchatel Asphalte Co., 41 Ch. D. 1 (1889); 2 CiRxx AND MA SmAL, PRIVATE COPORaA-
IONs (1901) 1593, 1594; 6 FLErcmm, PIUVATE CoaRoRATroNs (1917) § 3670; 7 TnoMisoN,
CoaRoRATioNs (3d ed. 1927) 5302; see Van Vleet v. Evangeline Oil Co., 129 La. 406, 410,
411, 56 So. 343, 344 (1911) ; cf. Young v. Haviland, 215 Mass. 120, 102 N. E. 338 (1913) ;
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payment was part of the usual income or profits of exploitation. Likewise taxation
of gross receipts as income, with inadequate allowance for capital depreciation, s and
of the total amount of dividends paid to stockholders9 has been sustained.'0 A
further explanation for the customary distribution of these dividends as trust income
is the simplicity of such a disposition, since a determination of what portion of such
distributed profits represents depleted capital, and what represents actual profits
of the process of exploitation, would require cumbersome calculation." Still another
basis for reaching this conclusion is found in the apparent belief that such a distribu-
tion was intended by the settlor. If specific evidence of his intent is available, whether
from indicative statements in the will or deed of trust or from extrinsic circumstances
as in the instant case,' 2 that intent is considered paramount over any other rule of
construction. 13 In the absence of any evidence pointing to a specific intent, the fact
that the average individual generally looks upon dividends from any source as being
income leads reasonably to the conclusion that the settlor of a particular trust intended
such a treatment.
Nevertheless if actual depletion of capital assets in the corporation has occurred as
a consequence of excessive dividend payment, and to such an extent as to impair seri-
ously the remainder interest in the stock held in trust, it would seem that the divi-
dends paid to the trustee should be apportioned between corpus and income. It can
scarcely be maintained that the settlor would intend that the entire corpus should
be exhausted, as a result of a liberal dividend policy, when its effect would be to ren-
der worthless the interest of the remaindermen. Had he so intended, the naming of
the remaindermen would have been superfluous. Consideration of this factor has in-
fluenced a Wisconsin court to hold that dividends declared by lumber companies, some
of which were closing out and others greatly reducing their timber acreage, should
be apportioned between corpus and income of a trust fund;' 4 and a similar alloca-
tion was directed in a California decision dealing with dividends resulting from
funds accumulated by a gradual sale of certain land, the sole asset of the realty
corporation paying the dividends.'1 To recognize the existence of this qualification,
Dealers' Granite Corp. v. Faubion, 18 S. W. (2d) 737 (Tex. 1929); Boothe v. Summit Coal
Mining Co., 55 Wash. 167, 104 Pac. 207 (1909).
8. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103 (1916). A statute may permit a
deduction for depletion, however. United States v. Nipissing Mines Co., 202 Fed. 803 (S. D.
N. Y. 1912).
9. Van Dyke v. Milwaukee, 159 Wis. 460, 146 N. W. 812 (1914).
10. Compare the rule permitting a life t nant to enjoy all profits realized from the ex-
ploitation of open mines, even to the exhaustion of the mineral deposits. Butler v. Butler,
176 Ark. 126, 2 S. W. (2d) 63 (1928); Crain v. West, 191 Ky. 1, 229 S. W. 51 (1921);
1 THORNTON, On AxD GAs (3d. ed. 1918) § 297; cf. Seager's Estate, 92 Mich. 186, 52 N. W.
299 (1892).
11. Oil dividends were held income partly on the basis that the depletion of an oil
well could not be accurately calculated. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. McCarter, supra
note 4.
12. De Brabant v. Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey, supra note 1, at 217, 218, 166
At. at 534, 535.
13. Matter of James, 146 N. Y. 78, 100, 101, 40 N. E. 876, 880 (2nd Dep't 1895).
14. Estate of Wells, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174 (1914).
15. Estate of Gartenlaub, 185 Cal. 375, 197 Pac. 90 (1921); cf. Rhode Island Hospital
Trust Co. v. Bradley, 41 R. I. 174, 103 At. 486 (1918). The New Jersey court has
previously permitted apportionment of mining dividends between the trust corpus and in-
come. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 113 N. J. Eq. 299, 166 At. 528 (1931).
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that an apportionment must be decreed where the remainder interest of the corpus
would otherwise be seriously impaired, in no way conflicts with the decisions which
establish that wasting asset dividends must go to the income of the trust. For these
decisions have resulted where the share value of the particular stock held in trust
was still high,16 where the corporations paying the dividends either owned extensive
properties, 17 or, after paying dividends out of an appreciation of capital assets, still
retained assets equal in value to the capital originally invested,'5 or where the
remaindermen despite the payment to income were reasonably certain of being
left a substantial sum.19 Consequently, these holdings do not preclude an allo-
cation between income and corpus in situations in which serious depletion in cor-
porate assets has resulted. In the instant case no real danger to the remainder
interest was shown, and therefore no necessity for apportionment existed. Had
it been established, however, that serious depletion had in fact resulted, it is
of the dividends as represented depleted capital.
20
POWERS OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IN PROHIBITING UNFAIR METHODS OF
COMPETITION
RESPONDENT sold in interstate commerce in competition with others penny candy
which it manufactured. As a means of stimulating the sale of its products, particu-
larly to children, who were the major purchasers of such candy, it employed various
devices partaking of the nature of gambling. It arranged one assortment of candies
so that coins were concealed within the wrappers of a few packages; another so
that the price to be paid for the piece of candy was not disclosed until the wrapper
had been removed; and a third so that the chance recipients of the few pieces with
colored centers were given prizes. The scheme was effective to increase sales,
despite the fact that the candy thus sold was, as found by the Federal Trade Com-
mission, inferior to that sold by competitors at similar prices. Upon investigation,
the Federal Trade Commission, acting under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com.
mission Act, issued an order to cease and desist the practice on the ground that it
constituted an unfair method of competition. This order was then reversed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals,' but upon appeal to the Supreme Court, was reinstated.-
16. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw; Waterman's Estate, both supra note 3.
17. Washington County Hospital v. Hagerstown Trust Co., supra note 5.
18. Oliver's Estate and Thompson's Estate, both supra note 6.
19. Reed v. Head, supra note 6, at 178.
20. Cf. Lannin v. Buckley, 256 Mass. 78, 152 N. E. 71 (1926); Matter of Enz., 204
App. Div. 634, 198 N. Y. Supp. 802 (3d Dep't 1923); LoSING, A TRuST&'S HANDBOO
(4th ed. 1928) 164, 165. The rule that wasting asset corporations do not dissipate capital
in dividends by failure to provide for a depletion reserve has also been questioned where
the depletion will injure preferred stockholders and creditors. Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Co.,
supra note 7, the much cited authority for this rule, has been weakened by later English
dicta. Bond v. Barrow Haematite Steel Co., [19023 1 Ch. 353; PAIAmR's CoMPANM LAW
(England, 13th ed. 1929) 227, 228. A Delaware decision, departing from the rule, has
received favorable comment. Wittenberg v. Federal Mining and Smelting Co., 15 Del. Ch.
147, 133 Atl. 48 (1926); noted in (1926) 40 HARv. L. REv. 318 and (1926) 75 U. or PA. L.
REv. 89. But cf. Note (1926) 12 CoRN. L. Q. 79. The decision was affirmed in 15 Del. Ch.
409, 138 Atl. 347 (1927). But compare the same case in 15 Del. Ch. 351, 138 Atl. 352
(1927).
1. R. F. Keppel and Brothers v. Federal Trade Commission, 63 F. (2d) 81 (C. C. A.
3d, 1933).
2. Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel and Brothers, 291 U. S. 304 (1934).
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A not infrequent judicial utterance concerning the Commission's powers under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, previous to this decision, was
that they extended only to those practices which had previously been condemned
as unfair under the Act, or which were unfair at common law, or which tended to-
ward the restraint of trade or the creation of monopoly.3 In the present case there was
no question of restraint of trade or monopoly; nor had the use of chance devices pre-
viously been adjudged illegal either at common law4 or under the Act.5 For that
reason the lower court refused to sustain the Commission's order. But the Supreme
Court, expressing a less restricted view of the scope of the Commission's powers,
declared that the prohibition of unfair methods of competition does not extend
solely to the above enumerated practices. It held that the prohibition may also
include other and new types of competition, 6 provided they are found to be unfair,
to result in an injury to those competitors who do not employ them,7 and to be of
sufficient public importance to satisfy the statutory requirement that the proceeding
be brought in the public interest.8 No question arose as to the existence of the latter
two requisites in this instance, the argument devolving around the question of
whether the practice was unfair. The Court held that it was, resting its conclusion
upon the ground that it was analogous to the forbidden practice of mislabelling
3. In Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427 (1920), the court said
that the words unfair methods of competition "are dearly inapplicable to practices never
heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized by deception, bad
faith, fraud, or oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous ten-
dency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly." Also, Denison, J., in L. B.
Silver Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 289 Fed. 985, 993 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923), said that
"a study of the Congressional Record convinces me that the Federal Trade Commission
was wholly collateral to the Sherman and other anti-trust acts, and that the 'unfair
methods of competition' intended to be reached by Section 5 are only such methods as tend
toward the monopoly or restraint of trade which the anti-trust laws prohibit." See Stand-
ard Oil Co. of New York v. Federal Trade Commission, 273 Fed. 478, 482 (C. C. A. 2d,
1921); Kinney-Rome Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 275 Fed. 665, 667 (C. C. A. 7th,
1921); John Bene and Sons, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed. 468, 471 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1924); Raladam Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 42 F. (2d) 430, 435 (C. C. A.
6th, 1930), aff'd, 283 U. S. 643 (1931); Federal Trade Commission v. Paramount Lasky
Corp., 57 F. (2d) 152, 154, 157 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
4. Cf. U. S. FEDERAL TRADE CoI:IssIoN, MEmORAND=Ua ON UNrAm COmPETION AT
CoammoN LAw (1916); NATIONAL INDUsTRIAL CoNEREcE BoARD, PuBLic REGULATIoN OF
Coam=iv PRAcTIcEs (Revised ed. 1929) 29-41.
5. While this was the first time in which the use of chance schemes was passed upon by
the Court, the Commission has from time to time issued a number of orders to cease and
desist such practices. For a few representative cases see In the Matter of Reinhart and
Newton Co., 10 Fed. Trade Com. Dec. 110 (1926); In the matter of A. L. Douglas and Co.
and Lincoln Sales Co., 16 Fed. Trade Com. Dec. 353 (1932).
6. This represented the first case in which the Supreme Court has expressly stated that
the Commission's jurisdiction is not confined to those practices theretofore held unfair, or
which tended towards an undue restraint of trade or creation of monopoly. For a similar
view see HENDERSON, Tnm FEDERAL TRADE Com-Ansso (1924) 33-37; Seligson, Trade Regu-
lation (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 698; Handler, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
over False Advertising (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 527, 530.
7. Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643 (1931).
8. Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19 (1929).
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goods 9 in that it compelled respondent's competitors either to adopt practices which
they were "under a strong moral compulsion not to adopt" or suffer a loss of busi-
ness. There is, of course, ample reason for distinguishing between the "element of
chance" employed in this case, and the "element of deception" involved in the usual
misbranding case. In the latter instance the consumer is deceived into purchasing
a different article than is represented to him. Here the plan was truthfully adver-
tised and the consumer when making his purchase got exactly what he was told he
would get, and what he evidently desired-a piece of candy and a chance.
Granting that those practices which business men "should not adopt" constitute
unfair methods of competition, the question still remains as to why, in the face of
a diversion of trade which might otherwise be retained, they should refuse to use
the method involved in the principal case. The reason is found in the injury which
its use will entail to the public. In the advertising cases, that injury consists of
deception with the resultant purchase of a different and usually inferior article than
is represented. In the case under consideration, while the deception element was
lacking, still the consumers of the product were induced by the gaming device to
purchase a product inferior to that which they might otherwise procure for the
same price. But in the eyes of the Court the financial injury was subordinate to
the moral one, which consisted of a tendency to encourage gambling, a form of
conduct that it deemed subversive of general morality and so contrary to public
policy as frequently to have been an object of statutory prohibition.
As significant as the Court's declaration that the Commission's powers under
Section 5 are not as restricted as had previously been assumed, is its statement to
the effect that in reviewing the orders of the Commission, its determination of what
is an unfair method of competition is "of weight." Although it is not made clear
just what weight is to be accorded that determination, the enunciation is important
as expressing an attitude not hitherto apparent.10 In the past, the Court, in the
exercise of its self-imposed duty of deciding as a matter of law what practices are
unfair,1 ' has paid the Commission's orders little respect and has not hesitated to
reject them.' 2 With the retention of the power to decide what practices are unfair.
the Court may still substitute its own findings and conclusions for those of the Com-
mission. But the language employed in this case, as well as the result, seems to
indicate a willingness to abstain from the exercise of that prerogative. To do so,
and consequently to accept as valid the conclusions of the Commission would be
greatly to increase its effectiveness in the suppression of questionable competitive
methods, a result in accord with the evident purpose of Congress in the establishment
of that body.13
9. The practice of misbranding goods sold in interstate commerce has long been con-
demned as an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U. S. 483 (1922);
Federal Trade Commission v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U. S. 212 (1933); Federal Trade
Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67 (1934).
10. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U. S. 619 (1927); see
HENmmsox op. cit. supra note 6, at 336; McFARLAND, JuDicIAL CONTROL OF T11E FERAL
TRADE CO-MassIoN AND THE INTERSTATE COMMrERCE COMAUSSION 1920-1930 (1933) 39-99.
11. Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920).
12. See note 10, supra.
13. The fact that the practice involved in this case was a comparatively petty one, and
one which the court believed to be contrary to the moral welfare of the public must be
considered in setting up this case as indicative of a more liberal attitude towards the Coin-
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VALIDITY OF VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE ATTACKED AS FRAUDULENT-ADmISSIBILITY
OF PAROL EVIDENCE TO VARY RECITAL OF CONSIDERATION IN DEED
PLAINTIFF, an existing creditor of the grantor, filed a bill to set aside as fraudulent
a conveyance made on a recited consideration of one dollar and love and affection.
The trial court, over complainant's objection, admitted evidence of an indebtedness
due from grantor to grantee as the true consideration for the deed, and dismissed the
bill on the ground that actual fraud, necessary to set aside a conveyance based on
valuable consideration, had not been proven. On appeal, the supreme court of
Alabama declared the deed void on its face and the admission of parol evidence to
be reversible error.1
The rule prevalent in eighteenth and nineteenth century England2 and given
powerful impetus in the United States by Chancellor Kent,3 that a voluntary convey-
ance 4 is absolutely voidable at the instance of creditors existing at the time of the
conveyance, regardless of the grantor's intent and financial position or the size of the
gift, prevails yet in some American jurisdictions. This may take the form of statute,5
or, where local enactments, modelled after the Statute of 13 Elizabeth c. 5,6 make
no specific provision as to the validity of voluntary conveyances, 7 the form of
judicial legislation.8 In support of this view, it is arguable that the subsequent in-
mission's findings. The court may not be so favorably disposed towards the Commission's
findings in a case concerning practices employed by a large corporation which really
involve a substantial restraint of trade. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 274 U. S. 619 (1927).
1. Schwab v. Powers, 153 So. 423 (Ala. 1934).
2. Taylor v. Jones, 2 Atk. 600 (1743); Townsend v. Windham, 2 Ves. Sr. 1 (1750);
Spirett v. Willows, 3 DeG. & S. 293 (1865).
3. Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481 (N. Y. 1818).
4. A voluntary conveyance "is a conveyance founded merely and exclusively on a good,
as distinguished from a valuable consideration, on motives of generosity and affection
rather than on a benefit received by the donor or detriment, trouble, or prejudice to the
donee." Bibb v. Freeman, 59 Ala. 612, 615 (1877).
5. Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 1907; OxLA. STAT. (1931) § 9697; VA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1930) § 5185; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 40, art. 1, § 3.
6. For the text of this'statute, the original fraudulent conveyance act, see GLENN, FRAUD-
ULENT CONVEYANCES (1931) Appendix, p. 587.
7. The Alabama statute is typical of those found in states where the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act is not in force. ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 8038: "All convey-
ances . ..made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, . . . of their lawful
suits, damages, forfeitures, debts or demands ...against the persons who are or may be
so hindered, delayed, or defrauded, their heirs, personal representatives and assigns, are
void."
8. Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 229 (U. S. 1823) (later overruled); Cato v. Easley, 2
Stew. 214 (Ala. 1829) (expressly following Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481 (N. Y.
1818)); Bibb v. Freeman, 59 Ala. 612 (1877); Wood v. Potts, 140 Ala. 425, 37 So. 253
(1903); Allen v. Overton, 208 Ala. 504, 94 So. 477 (1922); Ogletree v. Tate, 225 Ala. 608,
144 So. 573 (1932); Harris v. First National Bank, 227 Ala. 86, 149 So. 86 (1933);
Crosby v. Ross' Administrator, 26 Ky. 290 (1830); Enders v. Williams, 58 Ky. 346 (1858);
Hamilton v. Cunningham, 186 Ky. 570, 217 S. W. 924 (1920); Hatcher-Powers Shoe Co.
v. Sparks, 237 Ky. 321, 35 S. W. (2d) 564 (1930); Haston v. Castner, 31 N. J. Eq. 697
(1879) (following Ch. Kent's decision); Hancock v. Elmer, 61 N. J. Eq. 558, 49 Atl. 140,
1934] NOTES
YALE LAW JOURNAL
solvency of a debtor who makes such a transfer strongly indicates that his purpose
was to remove assets from the grasp of creditors. 9 The creation of a conclusive pre-
sumption of fraudulent intent from these facts possesses some degree of merit as an
objective standard since many gratuitous transfers assailed as fraudulent are made
between relatives by blood or marriage'0 and therefore are inherently suspicious."t
Its value, however, decreases directly with the remoteness of insolvency from the date
of conveyance. The rule, moreover, overlooks the major premise underlying the
statute of Elizabeth, that only conveyances which result in injury to creditors should
be invalidated.' 2 If the grantor, despite the gift, retained sufficient assets to meet
his existing obligations, the creditor has no grievance and is unduly favored if al-
lowed to set aside a conveyance in the event that subsequent unforeseen contin-
gencies or other conveyances have rendered the debtor insolvent. In operation, the
rule imposes severe disabilities on the good faith donee who, if insolvency occurs
and suit is brought near the expiration of a long term statute of limitations. may
be forced to surrender property years after the transfer; 13 under such circumstances,
the conclusive presumption of fraudulent intent arising from the mere fact of in-
solvency is unwarranted. Furthermore, transferees for value may be prejudiced;
if the complainant alleges that the conveyance was voluntary, the burden of proving
valuable consideration is placed on the grantee.14 The lapse of time between con-
veyance and trial, coupled with the probable reluctance of the insolvent grantor to
testify that the conveyance was supported by a consideration may render difficult
the production of unequivocal evidence of a consideration; the grantor would be
moved to assist creditors in setting aside the conveyance since, if their suit is suc-
cessful, his debts to them will be reduced accordingly.
In recognition of the undesirable consequences of this rule most states have re-
pudiated it in favor of one, codified in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,1
aff'd, 63 N. J. Eq. 802, 52 AtI. 1131 (1902) (since overruled--see note 18, infra); Harris
v. Harmon, 134 Okla. 116, 272 Pac. 383 (1928); Jackson v. Lewis, 34 S. C. 1, 12 S. E.
560 (1891) ; Betts v. Richardson, 112 S. C. 279, 99 S. E. 815 (1919) ; Battle v. Rock, 144
Va. 1, 131 S. E. 344 (1926); McCaskey v. Potts, 65 W. Va. 641, 64 S. E. 908 (1909).
9. "A man actually indebted, and conveying voluntarily, always means to be in fraud
of creditors, as I take it." Lord Hardwicke, in Townsend v. Windham, 2 Ves. Sr. 1, 11
(1750).
10. See cases supra, note 6.
11. Feaster v. Rooks, 293 S. W. 136 (Mo. 1927); Ferrell v. Elling, 84 Mont. 384, 276 Pac.
432 (1929).
12. GLENN, op. cit supra note 7, § 270.
13. E.g. Hancock v. Chapman, 170 Ky. 99, 185 S. W. 813 (1916) (suit brought just be-
fore expiration of 15 year statute of limitations) ; Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns Ch. 481
(N. Y. 1818) (debt incurred in 1800, reduced to judgment in 1807; conveyance in 1S05,
suit brought in 1816).
14. Kuykendall v. Terry, 227 Ala. 227, 149 So. 687, (1933); Cloud v. Middleton, 241 Ky.
595, 44 S. W. (2d) 559 (1931). See also cases cited supra note 6.
15. ARiz. Rav. CODE: (Struckmeyer, 1928) §§ 1525-1529; Del. Laws 1919, c. 207; MD.
CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 39B; MASS. GEr. LAWS (1932) c. 109A, §§ 1-13; MIcH. Com.
LAWS (1929) §§ 13392-13405; MmmN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§ 8475-8489; Nev. Laws 1931,
c. 217; N. H. PuB. LAws (1926) c. 361, §§ 1-12; N. J. CoM,. STAT. (Supp. 1924) §§ 44-142
to 44-154; N. Y. DEBTOR & CREarroR LAW (Cahill, 1930) §§ 270-279; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1930) tit. 39, §§ 351-363; S. D. Coirp. LAws (1929) §§ 2044A-2044N; TEN..
CODE (1932) §§ 7271-7282; UTAH EV. STAT. (1933) §§ 33-1-1 to 33-1-16; Wis. STAT.
(1931) §§ 242.01-242.13; Wyo. Ray. STAT. (1931) §§ 48-101 to 48-113.
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relating the validity of the gift to the debtor's financial condition; 16 under this doc-
trine a voluntary conveyance raises only a presumption of fraud as to existing
creditors, rebuttable by proof that the grantor was not left insolvent thereby.
17
While depriving the creditor of the overwhelming advantages formerly enjoyed, this
rule affords him ample protection by imposing upon the grantee the onus of showing
the debtor's continued solvency;' 8 if the presumption of fraud is not overcome, the
conveyance will not be sustained.19 Where the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
has not been adopted, two types of independent statutes are common. One provides
that fraudulent intent shall be a question of fact not of law, and that no conveyance
16. U. F. C. A., § 4: "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a
person who is or will thereby be rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without
regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without
a fair consideration."
17. Lloyd v. Fulton, 91 U. S. 479 (1875), overruling Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 229
(U. S. 1823); Castellano v. Osborne, 16 F. (2d) 187 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) (construing New
York act); Tidwell v. J. H. Askew & Co., 165 Ark. 57, 262 S. W. 988 (1924) ; Allee v. Shay,
92 Cal. App. 749, 268 Pac. 962 (1928); Salmon v. Bennett, 1 Conn. 525 (1816); Folsom
v. Farmer's Bank of Vero Beach, 102 Fla. 899, 136 So. 524 (1931); Jones v. Foster, 150
Ga. 277, 103 S. E. 491 (1920); Eames v. Dorsett, 147 Ill. 540, 35 N. E. 735 (1893);
Scovel v. Pierce, 208 Iowa 776, 226 N. W. 133 (1929); Merchants' Bank v. Page, 147
Md. 607, 128 Ati. 272 (1925); Splaine v. Morrissey, 282 Mass. 217, 184 N. E. 670 (1933);
Filley v. Register, 4 Minn. 391 (1860); National Surety Co. v. Wittich, 184 Minn. 44, 237
N. W. 690 (1931); Citizens Bank of Union v. Hilkemeyer, 325 Mo. 849, 29 S. W. (2d) 1090
(1930); Seward v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 406 (N. Y. 1826), overruling Reade v. Livingston, 3
Johns Ch. 481 (N. Y. 1818); Ga Nun v. Palmer, 216 N. Y. 603, 111 N. E. 223 (1916);
Unaka & City National Bank v. Lewis, 201 N. C. 148, 159 S. E. 312 (1931) ; Crumbaugh v.
Kugler, 2 Ohio St. 373 (1853); Peoples' Savings & Dime Bank v. Scott, 303 Pa. 294, 154 Atl.
489 (1931); Ramsey v. Abilene Building & Loan Association, 57 S. W. (2d) 877 (Tex. 1933);
Henry v. Yost, 88 Wash. 93, 152 Pac. 714 (1915).
18. McKeown v. Allen, 37 Fla. 490, 20 So. 556 (1896); Dillman v. Nadelhofer, 162 Ill.
625, 45 N. E. 680 (1896); Kolb v. Mall, 187 Iowa 193, 174 N. W. 226 (1919); Christopher
v. Christopher, 64 Md. 583, 3 At. 296 (1886); MacDonald v. Rumer, 320 Mo. 605, 8 S.
W. (2d) 592 (1928); Ga Nun v. Palmer, 216 N. Y. 603, 111 N. E. 223 (1916); Garland v.
Arrowood, 177 N. C. 371, 99 S. E. 100 (1919); Sherrod v. City Nat. Bank, 294 S.
W. 295 (Teax. Civ. App. 1927). See also cases cited supra note 17.
In some jurisdictions, a voluntary conveyance is not even presumptively fraudulent;
the attacking creditor must prove insolvency or intent to defraud, to invalidate the con-
veyance. McMillan v. McMillan, 42 Idaho 270, 245 Pac. 98 (1926); Nevers v. Hack, 139
Ind. 260, 37 N. E. 791 (1894) ; Ferrell v. EFling, 84 Mont. 384, 276 Pac. 432 (1929) ; Con-
way v. Raphel, 102 N. J. Eq. 531, 141 Ati. 804 (1928), overruling Haston v. Castner, 31 N. J.
Eq. 697 (1879); Camden Securities Co. v. Nurock, 112 N. J. Eq. 92, 163 Atl. 547 (1932);
Smith v. Poppen, 57 S. D. 25, 230 N. W. 229 (1930); Smith v. Edwards, 17 P. (2d) 264
(Utah 1932) semble.
19. Allee v. Shay, 92 Cal. App. 749, 268 Pac. 962 (1928); Scovel v. Pierce, 208 Iowa
776, 226 N. V. 133 (1929); Lynes v. Holt, 1 S. W. (2d) 121 (Mo. 1927); Dammers v.
Croft, 111 N. J. Eq. 462, 162 Atl. 734 (1932); Smith v. Reid, 134 N. Y. 568, 31 N. E.
1032 (1892); State Exchange Bank v. Royce, 26 Ohio App. 508, 160 N. E. 526 (1927);
Hart, Schaffner & Marx v. Koch, 107 Pa. Super. 528, 164 Atl. 369 (1933); Ramsey v.
Abilene Building & Loan Association, 57 S. W. (2d) 877 (Tex. 1933).
A voluntary conveyance will, of course, be set aside if the creditor can prove insolvency
of the grantor at the time of conveyance [Garner v. State Banking Co., 150 Ga. 6, 102 S.
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shall be adjudged void merely because of its voluntary character; 20 the other type,
more explicit, adds that voluntary transfers are void in the absence of proof that the
grantor retained sufficient assets to pay his then existing debts.21 The former group
of statutes might be interpreted as requiring proof of actual intent to defraud even
where insolvency after the conveyance is shown. But this result may be avoided
by the argument that regardless of the statutory provision, a gratuitous conveyance
which renders the donor financially disabled raises a conclusive presumption of
fraud since the grantor must have intended the natural consequences of his act, which
hindered creditors and so was "fraudulent in fact., 22 This device, indicative of the
traditional preference of creditors to mere volunteers, frees creditors, injured by the
gift, from the difficult task of proving subjective fraudulent intent, which a literal
construction of the statute might impose.23
In a state following the precedent of Reade v. Livingston,24 the possibilities of
prejudice to honest purchasers are greatly increased when, as in the instant case,
exclusion of parol evidence prevents proof of a valuable consideration. Deeds
reciting a nominal consideration,2 5 a consideration of love and affection,20 or
both,2 7 are voluntary as against existing creditors; such recitals constitute "good" -8
rather than valuable consideration.2 9  If the instrument acknowledges receipt of
value, parol evidence is admissible to show that no consideration was paid,30
E. 442 (1920); Ransom v. Lochmiller, 207 Iowa 1315, 224 N. V. 469 (1929)), or the
existence of an actual intent to defraud. Miller v. Nissen, 280 Mass. 267, 182 N. E. 366
(1932); Queen-Favorite Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Burnstein, 310 Pa. 219, 165 Atl. 13 (1933).
20. COLO. CoArP. LAWs (1921) § 5119; IDoO CODE ANN. (1932) § 54-908; INm. ANN.
STAT. (Bums, 1926) § 8068; MONT. REv. CODES (1921) § 8606; NEB, CoN'. STAT. (1929)
§ 36-405; N. Y. PERSONAL PROP. LAW (Cahill, 1930) §§ 37, 38 (not repealed on adoption of
U. F. C. A.); N. D. CoNx. LAws (1913) § 7223; ORE. CODE ANr. (1930) § 63-510.
21. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 3442; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 4149; N.
C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 1007; TEx. Rxv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 3997.
22. Briggs v. Sanford, 219 Mass. 572, 107 N. E. 436 (1914); National Bank of
Anaconda v. Yegen, 83 Mont. 265, 271 Pac. 612 (1928).
23. Cf. (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 822.
24. 3. Johns. Ch. 481 (N. Y. 1818).
25. Felder v. Harper, 12 Ala. 612 (1847) (recital, $10); Folmar v. Lehman-Durr Co.,
147 Ala. 472, 41 So. 750 (1906) (recital, $1); York v. Leverett, 159 Ala. 529, 48 So. 684
(1909) (recital, $2); May v. Gibler, 319 Mo. 672, 4 S. W. (2d) 769 (1928) ($1); Lincoln
Trust Co. v. Sweeney, 124 Neb. 686, 248 N. W. 67 (1933) ($1); Emmi v. Patane, 128 Misc.
901, 220 N. Y. Supp. 495 (Sup. Ct. 1927) ($1); State Exchange Bank v. Royce, 26 Ohio App.
508, 160 N. E. 526 (1927) ($1). Contra: (if deed expresses on its face any valuable consider-
ation, no matter how small, it is not voluntary). Washband v. Washband, 27 Conn. 424
(1858); Martin v. White, 115 Ga. 866, 42 S. E. 279 (1902); cf. Ferguson's Appeal, 117 Pa.
St. 426, 11 At. 885 (1888).
26. McKee v. West, 141 Ala. 531, 37 So. 740 (1904); Allee v. Shay, 92 Cal. App. 749,
268 Pac. 962 (1928); Oswald v. Nehs, 233 Ill. 438, 84 N. E. 619 (1908); Ferrell v. Elling,
84 Mont. 384, 276 Pac. 432 (1929) ; Schwartz v. Bachman, 267 Pa. 185, 110 Atl. 260 (1920)
(conveyance in consideration of past sexual intercourse is purely voluntary).
27. Houston v. Blackman, 66 Ala. 559 (1880); McKeown v. Allen, 37 Fla. 490, 20 So.
556 (1896); Ransom v. Lochmiller, 207 Iowa 1315, 224 N. W. 469 (1929).
28. § 3, U. F. C. A. uses the term "fair consideration" to describe the nature and ade-
quacy of valuable consideration.
29. See note 4, supra.
30. Liebowitz v. Arrow Roofing Co., 259 N. Y. 391, 182 N. E. 58 (1932); Harris v.
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that the true consideration was greater 31 or less32 than that recited, or that a differ-
ent variety of valuable consideration was given.33 In Alabama and a few other
states, however, a recital precludes the showing of a different charactef of considera-
tion. Thus if a "good" consideration is mentioned,--if, in other words, the convey-
ance was a gift---extrinsic evidence may not be introduced to prove that a valuable
consideration was in fact paid, on the theory that such evidence would violate the
rule against varying the legal effect of a deed. 34 By application of this principle,
evidence of an antecedent debt, always deemed valuable consideration, providing the
debt is bona fide and fairly proportionate to the worth of the property,35 was ex-
cluded in the instant case. The rule prohibiting variance of the terms or legal
effect of a written instrument is based on the current conception that a legal act
when reduced to writing is constituted, not merely proved by the document 3 6
Hence, when the whole of a transaction is embodied in a single writing, evidence
to dispute its terms is superfluous; but if the instrument was not intended to cover
a certain subject of negotiation, extrinsic evidence of the parties' conduct in regard
to that subject may be established. 37 The intention of the parties is the sole test
of whether the specific element of negotiation is embodied in the document.
38
In the principal case it is apparent from the defendant grantee's attempt to prove
the satisfaction of an antecedent debt as consideration that the deed as drawn did
not and was not intended to include the agrement of grantor and grantee on the
Harmon, 134 Okla. 116, 272 Pac. 383 (1928). For collection of older cases, see Note
(1910) 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1194, at 1197.
31. Savage v. Milum, 170 Ala. 115, 54 So. 180 (1910); London v. G. L. Anderson Brass
Works, 197 Ala. 16, 72 So. 359 (1916); Moon v. Gilliam, 187 Ark. 581, 61 S. W. (2d) 64
(1933); Knighton v. Des Portes Mercantile Co., 119 S. C. 340, 112 S. E. 343 (1922).
Contra: Brewer v. New Orleans Land Co., 154 La. 446, 97 So. 605 (1923) (recital $500;
evidence to show $106 additional consideration excluded). See (1924) 24 CoL. L. REV. 202.
32. Clark v. Lowe, 113 Mich. 352, 71 N. W. 638 (1897); Jost v. Wolf, 130 Wis. 37,
110 N. W. 232 (1907).
33. Pique v. Arendale, 71 Ala. 91 (1881) (recital, $800; evidence admitted to show real
consideration was antecedent debt); Mobile Savings Bank v. McDonnell, 89 Ala. 434, 8
So. 137 (1890) (recital, money; evidence admitted to show extinguishment of grantor's lia-
bility on two notes was actual consideration); Smith v. Hood, 212 Ala. 554, 103 So. 574
(1925) (recital, $105; evidence to show deed was in fact advancement held admissible).
For collection of cases, see Note (1910) 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1194, at 1198-1207.
34. Murphy v. Mobile Branch Bank, 16 Ala. 90 (1849); Potter v. Grade, 58 Ala. 303
(1877) ; Houston v. Blackman, 66 Ala. 559 (1880) ; Higdon v. Leggett, 20S Ala. 352, 94 So.
359 (1922); Carmack v. Lovett, 44 Ark. 180 (1884); Lawson v. Mullinix, 104 Md. 156, 64
AtI. 938 (1906); Latimer v. Latimer, 53 S. C. 483, 31 S. E. 304 (1898). Cf. Kern v. Gard-
ner, 26 Ohio App. 48, 159 N. E. 840 (1925) (recited consideration $9000; evidence inad-
missible to show true consideration was merely "good").
35. Allen v. Overton, 208 Ala. 504, 94 So. 477 (1922); J. I. Case Threshing Machine
Co. v. Packer, 81 Colo. 195, 254 Pac. 779 (1927); Drury v. State Capital Bank, 163 Md.
84, 161 AtI. 176 (1932); Bankers' Trust Co. v. Humber, 263 Mich. 426, 248 N. W. 858
(1933); Feaster v. Rooks, 293 S. W. 136 (Mo. 1927); Stalwart Building & Loan Associa-
tion v. Monahan, 104 Pa. Super. 498, 159 Ati. 189 (1932). This rule was adopted in §
3, U. F. C. A.
36. 5 WIGmoRE, EvmsNcE (1923) § 2426.
37. Id. § 2425.
38. Id. § 2430.
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subject of consideration; no situation could more clearly demand extrinsic evidence
to effectuate the intent of the parties.
Failure to comprehend the policy of the parol evidence rule is further illustrated
by the inconsistency with which the Alabama courts have applied it. In that
jurisdiction, evidence has always been admissible to show that a recited valuable
consideration was not paid;39 the effect of this is to vary the legal effect of the deed
to at least as great a degree as would evidence of a valuable consideration where
"good" consideration is recited. In the majority of states, however, the Alabama
interpretation of the parol evidence rule has been expressly repudiated by decision 40
or statute, 41 or has not been observed. 42 And two Alabama cases have indicated that
in an action to set aside a conveyance voluntary on its face, the unfortunate conse-
quences of the rule may be mitigated if the defendant files a cross bill for reformation,
alleging that on account of mistake, the deed as written failed correctly to express
the intent of the parties with respect to consideration.43 However, the availability
39. "When between the grantee, and an existing creditor, a controversy arises as to
the validity of the conveyance, it has long been the settled rule of this State, that the recital
of a consideration, is the mere declaration or admission of the grantor, and is not evidence
against the creditor." Hubbard v. Allen, 59 Ala. 283, 296 (1877). Accord: Myers v.
Peek's Administrator, 2 Ala. 648 (1841); Saunders v. Hendrix, 5 Ala. 224 (1843); Ely v.
Pace, 139 Ala. 293, 35 So. 877 (1903) ; Kuykendall v. Terry, 227 Ala. 227, 149 So. 687 (1933).
To the same effect, see WIGooRE, op. cit. supra note 36, § 2433.
40. In each of the following cases and in the cases cited infra note 42, evidence of a
valuable consideration was admitted to contradict a recital of mere "good" consideration
(usually love and affection or one dollar and love and affection), or vice versa. Carty v.
Connolly, 91 Cal. 15, 27 Pac. 599 (1891); Nichols, Shepherd & Co. v. Burch, 128 Ind. 324,
27 Nq. E. 737 (1891); Gordon v. Gordon, 58 Ky. 285 (1858); Ecton v. Flynn, 229 Ky. 476,
17 S. W. (2d) 407 (1929); Harman v. Fisher, 90 Neb. 688, 134 N. W. 246 (1912); Voight
v. Dowe, 74 N. J. Eq. 560, 70 AtI. 344 (1908); Dieckman v. Walser, 114 N. J. Eq. 382,
168 At. 582 (1933); Velton v. Carmack, 23 Ore 282, 31 Pac. 658 (1892); Jack v. Daugh-
erty, 3 Watts 151 (Pa. 1834) ; Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 (1883).
41. ILL. Rxv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 59, § 3, is in general typical: "The consider-
ation" (of any instrument required to be in writing by the statute of frauds) "need not be
set forth or expressed in the writing, but may be proved or disproved by parol or other
legal evidence." CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. (Deering, 1931) §§ 1962 (2), 1963 (39); GA.
CODE AxN. (Michie, 1926) § 4179; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 472; Mic. Comp. LAWS
(1929) § 13414; MONT. REV. CoDEs (1921) § 10605(2); NEB. Com'. STAT. (1929) § 36408;
ORE CODE AxN. (1930) § 9-806(3).
42. Thompson v. Cody, 100 Ga. 771, 28 S. E. 669 (1897); Chantland v. Sherman, 148
Iowa 352, 125 N. W. 871 (1910); Ransom v. Lochmiller, 207 Iowa 1315, 224 N. W. 469
(1929); Haden v. Sims, 150 So. 210 (Miss. 1933); Edwards v. Latimer, 183 Mo. 610, 82
S. W. 109 (1904); Unaka & City National Bank v. Lewis, 201 N. C. 148, 159 S. E.
312 (1931); People's Savings & Dime Bank v. Scott, 303 Pa. 294, 154 At. 489 (1931); Lind-
say v. Texas Iron & Steel Co., 9 S. W. (2d) 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Davis v. Southern
Distributing Co., 148 Va. 779, 139 S. E. 495 (1927) semble; cf. Finley v. Williams, 325 Mo.
688, 29 S. W. (2d) 103 (1930) (recital of $1 and other good and valitable considerations).
But cf. Yates v. Burt, 161 Mo. App. 267, 143 S. W. 73 (1912) (recited valuable con-
sideration; evidence to prove deed in reality a gift held inadmissible).
43. Berry, Demoville & Co. v. Sowell, 72 Ala. 14 (1882) (deed reciting love and affec-
tion reformed at instance of grantee to show valuable consideration paid) ; Orr v. Echols,
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of reformation as a remedy may be impaired or negatived by the requirement of an
unequivocal showing of mutuality of mistake44 and by the often-reiterated doctrine
that an instrument will not be reformed "for a mere mistake of law."
45
119 Ala. 340, 24 So. 357 (1898) (deed recited love and affection; reformation granted to
show antecedent debt as consideration).
44. ". . . courts of equity proceed with very great caution in reforming written instru-
ments, and, if the mistake as alleged is not admitted, it must be proved by clear, exact,
and satisfactory evidence . . ." Folmar v. Lehman-Durr Co., 147 Ala. 472, 477, 41 So.
750, 751 (1906) (reformation to show valuable consideration denied).
45. Kelly v. Turner, 74 Ala. 513 (1883) (reformation denied); See West End Savings
Bank v. Goodwin, 223 Ala. 185, 188, 135 So. 161, 163 (1931).
